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MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE LAW: REGULATION AT THE 
ROOT OF AN INDUSTRY 
Ryan B. Stoa* 
Abstract 
Marijuana legalization is sweeping the nation. Recreational marijuana 
use is legal in eight states. Medical marijuana use is legal in thirteen 
states. Only three states maintain an absolute criminal prohibition on 
marijuana use.  Many of these legalization initiatives propose to regulate 
marijuana in a manner similar to alcohol, and many titles are variations 
of the “Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act.” For political and public 
health reasons the analogy makes sense, but it also reveals a regulatory 
blind spot. States may be using alcohol as a model for regulating the 
distribution, retail, and consumption of marijuana, but marijuana is much 
more than a retail product. It is also an agricultural product, and by some 
measures, the largest cash crop in the United States. Since marijuana 
prohibition laws were passed long before any cultivation regulations, 
states now face an unprecedented challenge: to regulate, for the first time 
ever, one of the country’s largest agricultural industries.  
Major regulatory challenges lie ahead, and how states respond to those 
challenges will shape the course of the marijuana industry. At present, 
there is a lack of understanding of the regulatory challenges marijuana 
agriculture presents and the options states have to address them. This 
Article identifies those challenges and the regulatory approaches most 
capable of addressing them. The study begins by describing the existing 
state of marijuana agriculture regulations. States are likely to find that the 
marijuana industry’s unique characteristics justify a tailored regulatory 
approach; relying on existing agricultural policies may be ineffectual or 
lead to perverse outcomes. Next, the study explores fundamental 
questions about the “marijuana fragmentation spectrum.” Will the 
industry come to be dominated by agricultural conglomerates mass-
producing a marijuana commodity, as many have feared? Or will 
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governments and the industry adopt the appellation model favored by the 
wine industry to protect local farmers and differentiate between products? 
The study also analyzes the major environmental impacts of marijuana 
agriculture, including regulations that address water allocation, water 
quality, energy, organic certification, and crop insurance. Finally, the 
study addresses power distribution trade-offs within marijuana 
agriculture regulation frameworks, including local vs. state, and 
consolidated vs. fragmented, regulatory authority dilemmas. The findings 
suggest that responsible and sustainable marijuana agriculture can be 
fostered at the state level, but only if regulations are responsive to the 
unique and unprecedented challenges that marijuana agriculture presents.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Across the United States, voters are weighing the costs and benefits 
of marijuana legalization. As many as sixty marijuana legalization 
initiatives were proposed to appear on election ballots in 2016.1 
Following the elections, recreational marijuana use is now legal in eight 
states.  Medical marijuana use is legal in thirteen states.  Only three states 
maintain an absolute criminal prohibition on marijuana use.2 As states 
move toward legalization, governments will need to address a broad 
range of regulatory issues, including the distribution, sale, and 
consumption phases of the supply chain. But legal marijuana’s track 
record so far suggests that the agricultural component of the marijuana 
industry is being ignored. Whether states are failing to appreciate 
marijuana’s agricultural roots or choosing to disregard them, the 
industry’s direction will be out of state control until regulatory 
frameworks are in place.  
Nowhere has this been more apparent than in California. In 1996, 
California voters passed Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act 
(CUA).3 With the CUA, California became the first state to legalize the 
medicinal use of marijuana, exempting patients and prescribing 
physicians from criminal prosecution.4 The text of the Act was short and 
did not address how the state or local governments should regulate the 
marijuana industry. It did not, for example, assign regulatory authority to 
an administrative agency, articulate limits on possession or cultivation, 
or propose a broad regulatory framework from which the state or local 
governments could operate.  
In the wake of the CUA a legal medical marijuana industry developed 
in California, and the industry experienced tremendous growth,5 
notwithstanding the absence of any meaningful state regulations. But the 
CUA’s omissions prompted the state legislature to enact the Medical 
                                                                                                                     
 1. David Downs, 20 States Report Pot Legalization Measures in 2016 Election, SF GATE 
(Feb. 18, 2016, 10:41 AM), http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2016/02/18/20-states-report-pot-
legalization-measures-in-2016-election.  
 2. See 28 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG, 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881&print=true (last 
updated Dec. 28, 2016, 11:36 AM) (listing marijuana state laws along with the year in which they 
were passed).    
 3. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 215 (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 11362.5 (West 2016)). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Tony Pugh, Medical Marijuana Industry Rapidly Grows Mainstream, 
MCCLATCHYDC (Mar. 30, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-
world/national/article24618997.html. According to one study, by 2010 nearly 80% of marijuana 
consumed in the United States came from California. See id. 
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Marijuana Program Act (MMPA) in 2003,6 which, among other 
measures, restricted the number of plants medical marijuana patients or 
designated caregivers could cultivate,7 and assigned further regulatory 
authority to the Attorney General.8 Even these limits, however, became 
legally ambiguous guidelines after the California Supreme Court ruled 
that the rights established by constitutional amendment Proposition 215 
could not be limited by legislative act.9 The upshot of these early 
experiments with marijuana legalization is that California’s burgeoning 
marijuana industry has been more or less unregulated for twenty years.10 
In the absence of regulation, marijuana cultivation in California has 
exploded, with approximately fifty thousand marijuana farms accounting 
for 60% of all marijuana grown in the United States.11 There are as many 
marijuana farms in Humboldt County, California, as there are wineries 
statewide.12 And this unchecked growth in marijuana agriculture has 
consequences for the sustainability and potential growth of the industry. 
Marijuana farming has been blamed for sucking rivers dry,13 poisoning 
soil and water resources with pesticides and rodenticides,14 and clearing 
mature forests.15 Many of these criticisms are flawed, as research on the 
                                                                                                                     
 6. 2003 Cal. Stat. 6422 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.7–.83 (West 
2016)).  
 7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.77. 
 8. Id. § 11362.77(e). 
 9. People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 209, 210 (Cal. 2010). 
 10. See Josh Harkinson, New California Laws Are a Big Deal for People Who Care 
Where Their Pot Comes from, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 16, 2015, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/ politics/2015/09/california-medical-marijuana-bill-pot-smokers-
environment (noting California’s unique “hands-off approach”).  
 11. Alissa Walker, How Growing More Weed Can Help California Fix Its Water Problems, 
GIZMODO (Oct. 12, 2015, 1:40 PM), http://gizmodo.com/how-growing-more-weed-can-help-
california-fix-its-water-1732169259. 
 12. See id. (comparing the four thousand wineries in California to the four thousand pot 
farms in Humboldt County). 
 13. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Species; Recovery Plans, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,750 
(Sept. 30, 2014) (discussing one of the objectives of the Endangered and Threated Species 
Recovery Plans “to improve degraded habitat”); Scott Bauer et al., Impacts of Surface Water 
Diversions for Marijuana Cultivation on Aquatic Habitat in Four Northwestern California 
Watersheds, PLOS ONE, Mar. 18, 2015, at 1, 17; Munchies Staff, Your Marijuana Habit Is Still 
Sucking California Dry, VICE: MUNCHIES (Apr. 10, 2015), https://munchies.vice.com/en/articles/ 
your-marijuana-habit-is-still-sucking-california-dry. 
 14. See, e.g., Craig Thompson et al., Impacts of Rodenticide and Insecticide Toxicants from 
Marijuana Cultivation Sites on Fisher Survival Rates in the Sierra National Forest, California, 7 
CONSERVATION LETTERS 91, 97 (2014). 
 15. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Carah et al., High Time for Conservation: Adding the Environment 
to the Debate on Marijuana Liberalization, 65 BIOSCIENCE 822, 824 (2015), citing Jim F. 
Milestone et al., Continued Cultivation of Illegal Marijuana in U.S. Western National Parks, 
Proceedings from the 2011 George Wright Society Conference on Parks, Protected Areas, and 
Cultural Sites 209 (2012).  
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environmental impacts of marijuana farming is nascent and rarely 
acknowledges that farmers can grow responsibly and sustainably on 
private lands.  
Many farmers would welcome the security of compliance with state 
and local laws, while being distinguished from cartel operations or 
destructive “trespass grows” on public lands. As it stands, farms on 
private property remain vulnerable to police raids and asset forfeiture 
laws16 and are unable to take advantage of typical agricultural 
government services, such as crop insurance programs or pesticide-free 
certifications. Because marijuana agriculture’s regulatory contours have 
remained ambiguous for so long, states and the public alike poorly 
understand the marijuana agriculture industry. This disconnect presents a 
threat to responsible management of legal marijuana markets.  
Fortunately, change is on the horizon in California. In January 2016, 
the Medical Marijuana Regulation and Safety Act (MMRSA) came into 
effect,17 with ambitious proposals to create comprehensive regulations 
for marijuana agriculture.18 The MMRSA assigns authority for various 
regulatory responsibilities to a variety of state agencies, including the 
Department of Food and Agriculture, Department of Fish and Wildlife, 
Department of Public Health, and the State Water Resources Control 
Board.19 Said the author of the bill, “Cultivators are going to have to 
comply with the same kinds of regulations that typical farmers 
do. . . . [I]t’s going to be treated like an agriculture product . . . .”20 It took 
twenty years to get there, but marijuana cultivation has finally been 
recognized as an agricultural activity in California, and may now be 
regulated as such.21 
The same cannot be said for every state that has legalized, or is 
considering legalizing, medicinal or recreational marijuana. In many 
states, the immediate regulatory priority is the distribution, sale, and 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See Adrian Fernandez Baumann, A Carrot and Stick for Pot Farmers, E. BAY EXPRESS 
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/a-carrot-and-stick-for-pot-farmers/ 
Content?oid=4454890&showFullText=true (“Asset forfeiture laws allow police to seize large 
amounts of money and assets in pot busts.”). 
 17. 2015 Cal. Stat. 5293 (codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE).  
 18. Id. 
 19. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 19332 (West 2016). 
 20. Assemblymembers Urge Governor Brown to Sign Medical Marijuana Package, NEWS 
CHANNEL 3, http://kiem-tv.com/video/assemblymembers-urge-governor-brown-sign-medical-
marijuana-package (last visited Nov. 2, 2016). 
 21. Patrick McGreevy, California Sets New Rules for Medical Pot Industry, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 9, 2015, 6:09 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-gov-brown-on-
medical-marijuana-regulations-20151009-story.html.  
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consumption of marijuana.22 Colorado legalized recreational marijuana 
by passing Amendment 64: The Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act of 
2012.23 For political and public health reasons the analogy makes sense, 
but it also reveals a regulatory blind spot. States may be using alcohol as 
a model for regulating the distribution, retail, and consumption of 
marijuana, but marijuana is much more than a retail product. It is also an 
agricultural product and, by some measures, the largest cash crop in the 
United States.24 Since marijuana prohibition laws were passed long 
before any regulations for cultivation developed, states now face an 
unprecedented challenge: to regulate, for the first time ever, one of the 
country’s largest agricultural industries.   
Early indications suggest that states are making little effort to regulate 
marijuana cultivation, or are failing to appreciate the disruptive potential 
of marijuana agriculture.25 Eight states have legalized recreational 
marijuana cultivation and use.  Thirteen states have legalized medical 
marijuana cultivation and use.26 But few of these states are anticipating 
the unique regulatory challenges that marijuana agriculture presents. 
Even fewer are prepared to tackle them. 
This Article argues that marijuana is a burgeoning agricultural 
industry and calls for regulations that recognize it as such. As the field of 
marijuana agriculture law is incipient, this Article provides a roadmap for 
the major regulatory issues states and the industry are likely to encounter. 
Many agricultural policies and programs are created or supported by the 
federal government, and these would not apply to marijuana agricultural 
activities that run afoul of federal marijuana prohibition laws. Therefore, 
states and the marijuana industry will need to be creative in providing 
analogous regulatory functions. 
The most immediate choice regulators will have to make is between 
an approach that incorporates the marijuana industry into the existing 
regulatory framework for agriculture (essentially treating marijuana like 
any other agricultural product), or an approach that creates a separate 
regulatory framework for marijuana cultivation. While the former has its 
benefits, and may be achievable long-term, marijuana’s transition from 
the black market may call for a targeted regulatory scheme in the interim.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 22. State Marijuana Laws Map, GOVERNING DATA, http://www.governing.com/gov-
data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html (last updated Nov. 11, 2016).  
 23. 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 3291 (codified as amended at COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16). 
 24. JON GETTMAN, MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2006), 
http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr2/MJCropReport_2006.pdf. 
 25. See generally MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA 
LAWS (2015) (discussing an overview of state laws on marijuana from 1978 to the present).     
 26. State Marijuana Laws Map, supra note 22.   
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Another fundamental issue facing the marijuana agriculture industry 
has not yet been conclusively resolved: Is marijuana an agricultural 
commodity? Commodities are fungible goods with no qualitative 
differentiation, such as wheat or soybeans. Many existing farmers fear 
that marijuana markets will be flooded with cheap, indistinct marijuana 
grown by “Big Ag” conglomerates.27 To counteract these concerns, some 
industry groups advocate for states to adopt an appellation model28 of 
marijuana cultivation that would preserve markets for regional marijuana 
products and maintain quality standards.29 States and counties can play a 
large role in this existential question by adopting or rejecting the 
appellation model, or by enacting other regulations that facilitate or 
preclude the consolidation of marijuana agriculture. 
The environmental component of marijuana agriculture will also 
require regulatory attention. Pesticides and fertilizers facilitate plant 
growth but may reduce soil and water quality.30 States and the marijuana 
industry may wish to cultivate a market for organic or pesticide-free 
marijuana.31 Marijuana agriculture also requires appropriate quantities of 
water for irrigation and, when grown indoors, energy resources. 
Regulators must balance an interest in providing resources to a growing 
industry with the need to manage those resources sustainably.  
When the environment does not cooperate, the federal government has 
been instrumental in providing stability to the agricultural industry by 
regulating crop insurance and providing disaster relief.32 As marijuana 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Jeremy B. White, California Pot Farmers Wrestle with New Medical Marijuana Rules, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 17, 2015, 10:10 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
government/capitol-alert/article45255678.html.  
 28. Derived from the French term, appellation d’origine contrôlée, an appellation is a 
legally protected geographic designation, known most commonly for its adoption by the wine 
industry. Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011). 
 29. See, e.g., Anita Chabria, Why Marijuana Growers Want Champagne-Like Labels for 
Their Weed, GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2016, 2:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/ 
jan/12/marijuana-growers-labels-cannabis-california-legal-weed; Paul Payne, Mendocino County 
Growers Plan Pot Appellations to Promote Cannabis Country, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Aug. 27, 
2016), http://www.pressdemocrat.com/news/5958381-181/mendocino-county-growers-plan-pot 
?artslide=0.  
 30. See Wasim Aktar et al., Impact of Pesticides use in Agriculture: Their Benefits and 
Hazards, 2 INTERDISC. TOXICOLOGY 1, 8 (2009); James Stephen Carpenter, Farm Chemicals, Soil 
Erosion and Sustainable Agriculture, 13 STAN. ENVT’L L.J. 190, 198, 201 (1994). 
 31. See, e.g., Rachel E. Gross, Why Is It So Hard to Get Clean Weed?, SLATE 
(Apr. 20, 2016, 11:54 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2016/04/there_ 
s_a_clean_natural_weed_movement_but_it_can_t_call_itself_organic_here.html; Susan Squibb, 
Desperately Seeking Outdoor-Grown, Organic Colorado Marijuana, CANNABIST (Jan. 4, 2016, 
6:09 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2016/01/04/organic-marijuana-outdoor-pesticides/38301.  
 32. Federal Disaster Assistance & Crop Insurance Programs: An Overview, NAT’L AGRIC. 
L. CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/disasterassistancecropinsurance (last updated 
Jan. 23, 2014); see, e.g., What Is the Role of the Federal Government in Crop Insurance?, 
 
7
Stoa: Marijuana Agriculture Law: Regulation At The Root Of An Industry
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
304 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
 
farmers would not be eligible for these programs, states may want to 
provide their own support structures. However, it may be difficult to 
avoid the federal government’s institutional and legal reach, presenting 
federal preemption concerns. 
Another question concerns power sharing: Where can (or should) 
regulatory authority be placed? Local governments may play a large role 
in the direction of marijuana agriculture, as states with marijuana 
regulations have so far been broadly permissive of counties and 
municipalities creating their own (often more restrictive) marijuana 
agriculture regulations.33 Local governments can utilize their lawmaking 
powers to shape agricultural policy for the marijuana industry, but this 
decentralized form of policy making may come at the expense of 
regulatory clarity for the state as a whole.  
Keeping the regulatory framework centralized on the state level 
provides more consistency but may be difficult to apply in states where 
political support for marijuana cultivation changes drastically by 
jurisdiction. In addition, states will need to decide whether to consolidate 
regulatory authority for marijuana into one state agency, or to assign 
different roles and responsibilities to several agencies and regulate 
cooperatively. Colorado has adopted the former model,34 while 
California has adopted the latter.35  
In February 2016, Humboldt County passed a comprehensive 
commercial marijuana cultivation ordinance,36 one of the first of its kind. 
As the heart and soul of California’s marijuana agriculture sector, 
Humboldt County has consistently played a leadership role in the 
development of the marijuana industry, and this ordinance may prove 
instrumental in shaping marijuana agriculture policies around the 
country. The ordinance addresses many of the issues identified in this 
Article, placing limits on farm size, water, and energy use, while 
developing an artisanal labelling program.37 The Humboldt County 
ordinance is an ideal case study for the nascent field of marijuana 
agriculture law and underscores the need for state and local governments 
across the nation to start developing their own regulatory framework.   
Never before has a major agricultural product entered legal markets 
with the pace and scale that marijuana is entering them today. States face 
                                                                                                                     
CROP INS., http://www.cropinsuranceinamerica.org/just-the-facts/what-is-the-role-of-the-federal-
government-in-the-crop-insurance-program/#.V-n6zmO_tFJ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017). 
 33. See, e.g., BUTTE, CAL., CODE ch. 34A (2017). 
 34. See, e.g., PUEBLO, COLO., CODE ch. 5.12, § 5.12.030 (2013) (“[T]he Pueblo County 
Liquor and Marijuana Licensing Board shall have the power and authority to suspend, fine, restrict 
or revoke [marijuana] licenses . . . .”). 
 35. See, e.g., KERN, CAL., CODE ch. 5.85, § 5.85.030 (2016) (discussing relationships to 
other laws). 
 36. HUMBOLDT, CAL., CODE tit. III, div. 1, ch. 3, § 313-55.4 (2016). 
 37. Id. 
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an unprecedented regulatory challenge, and ignoring the agricultural 
dimension of the marijuana industry is not a sound long-term approach. 
This Article will present and analyze the most significant legal and 
regulatory challenges states will face when legalizing marijuana. 
Responsible and sustainable marijuana agriculture can be fostered at the 
state level, but only if regulations are responsive to the unique and 
unprecedented challenges that marijuana agriculture presents. 
I.  THERE AND BACK AGAIN: MARIJUANA’S LONG ROAD TO REGULATED 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT 
Marijuana is one of humanity’s oldest cultivated crops.  It can be 
traced back 12,000 years to hunter-gatherers who appreciated its 
nutritious and psychoactive properties.38 In Neolithic times it traveled 
from its roots in China and Siberia along the Silk Road to the Middle East 
and Europe,39 and, once established, it flourished in classical Greek, 
Roman, and Arab societies.40 European colonists spread marijuana 
cultivation, trade, and use throughout the Western Hemisphere and into 
what is now the United States.41 
For many years, marijuana’s presence in the United States was 
overshadowed by the other major derivative of its taxonomic species 
cannabis sativa: hemp.42 Marijuana is primarily grown and used for its 
medicinal or recreational psychoactive properties. Hemp strains, 
however, are grown to produce food, textiles, paper, and other 
materials.43 Queen Elizabeth required large landowners throughout the 
British Empire to grow hemp to counter Britain’s reliance on Russian 
hemp imports;44 later the Jamestown colonists would be required to do 
the same.45 Both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were hemp 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Barney Warf, High Points: An Historical Geography of Cannabis, 104 GEOGRAPHICAL 
REV. 414, 418?19 (2014). 
 39. Id. at 420. 
 40. Id. at 423. 
 41. Id. at 425–26. 
 42. For a review of the taxonomy of marijuana and hemp, see generally Shannon L. 
Datwyler & George D. Weiblen, Genetic Variation in Hemp and Marijuana (Cannabis Sativa L.) 
According to Amplified Fragment Length Polymorphisms, 51 J. FORENSIC SCI. 371 (2006); Ernest 
Small & Arthur Cronquist, A Practical and Natural Taxonomy for Cannabis, 25 TAXON 405 
(1976). 
 43. See generally ROWAN ROBINSON, THE GREAT BOOK OF HEMP: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL, COMMERCIAL, AND MEDICINAL USES OF THE WORLD’S MOST 
EXTRAORDINARY PLANT (1996) (describing the development of a modern industrial hemp industry 
and the various uses of hemp therein). 
 44. Warf, supra note 38, at 426. 
 45. MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA—MEDICAL, 
RECREATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 16 (2012). 
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growers, and a draft of the Declaration of Independence was written on 
hemp.46 John Adams was a prominent supporter of hemp cultivation, 
writing frequently about its benefits.47 “Seems to me if grate Men dont 
leeve off writing Pollyticks, breaking Heads, boxing Ears, ringing Noses 
and kicking Breeches, we shall by and by want a world of Hemp more 
for our own consumshon,” Adams wrote.48  
Hemp and marijuana would continue to be grown throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.49 Like any other legal 
agricultural commodity, marijuana would have been subject to variations 
in state agricultural laws and policies.50 In jurisdictions east of the 
Mississippi River, for example, marijuana cultivation would have been 
permitted as long as it was reasonable vis a vis other riparians.51 The fact 
that a water rights dispute before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 
1852 involved a contractual obligation to use water solely for certain 
purposes that included a hemp-mill was found unremarkable by the 
court.52  
In western states, marijuana cultivation—perceived as agriculture—
would have met the requirements of beneficial use, thereby vesting water 
rights in accordance with temporal seniority. An early Colorado case 
establishing the prior appropriation doctrine noted the “necessity for 
artificial irrigation of the soil.”53 In 1947, a California tax dispute 
involved the development of wells for purposes of irrigating hemp.54 The 
court thought the plan could “prove a profitable industry,” before moving 
on to the legal matter at issue.55  
Eventually the politicization of marijuana, as well as the widespread 
use of both hemp and marijuana in the United States catalyzed opposition 
to cannabis sativa’s legality from multiple angles. On the one hand, 
marijuana’s early popularity with immigrants and bohemian communities 
produced reactionary prejudices that prompted crude public campaigns 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at 16, 18. 
 47. Corliss Knapp Engle, John Adams, Farmer and Gardener, ARNOLDIA, 2002, at 9, 10. 
 48. Letter from Humphrey Ploughjogger to the Boston Evening-Post (June 20, 1763), in 1 
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 63, 66 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1977). 
 49. By some accounts, it became the third largest cash crop in the United States by the mid-
nineteenth century. LEE, supra note 45, at 19. 
 50. See Production Contracts, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/ 
research-by-topic/production-contracts (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).  
 51. E.g., Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241, 256 (1848) (“Each riparian proprietor is entitled to 
a reasonable use of the water, for domestic, agricultural and manufacturing purposes . . . .”). 
 52. See Washabaugh v. Oyster, 18 Pa. 497, 498 (1852). 
 53. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449 (1882). 
 54. Lerdo Land Co. v. Comm’r, 6 T.C.M. 1285 (1947).  
 55. Id.  
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to criminalize the drug.56 On the other hand, hemp’s industrial versatility 
was a threat to the cotton industry and other producers of textiles.57 
Despite strong support in the medical and pharmaceutical industries (the 
agriculture industry was less supportive), twenty-nine states banned 
cannabis between 1915 and 1931.58  
The federal government then passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,59 
creating barriers to marijuana production, sale, and consumption.60 The 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Leary v. United States61 overturned the 
Marihuana Tax Act on the grounds that compliance would violate a 
person’s right against self-incrimination.62 But the decision prompted 
Congress to repeal the Act and replace it with the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,63 which categorized 
marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic with prohibitions on cultivation, sale, 
possession, and use.64 Cannabis (including marijuana and hemp) has been 
a black market crop ever since. 
Because states developed modern regulatory regimes in the latter half 
of the twentieth century (after marijuana was criminalized),65 those 
regimes have never regulated the marijuana industry. This is true of many 
agricultural laws and policies as well, which federal agricultural policy 
has traditionally dictated or influenced. Until the Dust Bowl of the 1930s 
ravaged farming communities, the federal government’s role in 
agriculture was minimal;66 if droughts or crop failures caused farmland 
to become unusable, farmers were forced to relocate without any type of 
                                                                                                                     
 56. Warf, supra note 38, at 429; see also TELL YOUR CHILDREN (G and H Productions 1936) 
(depicting the graphic horrors of marijuana use in ways that would appear satirical today).  
 57. See Warf, supra note 38, at 429. 
 58. Collin B. Walsh & Daniel T. Nau, The History, Law, and Psychology of Criminalizing 
Marijuana: A Comparative Analysis with Alcohol and Tobacco 19 (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of 
Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 274, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2355151##. 
 59. Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937), repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).  
 62. Id. at 13. 
 63. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012)).  
 64. Id.; Walsh & Nau, supra note 58, at 23. 
 65. See Ryan Stoa, Florida Water Management Districts and the Florida Water Resources 
Act: The Challenges of Basin-Level Management, 7 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 73, 79 
(2015) (describing how the spread of environmental awareness led to the passing of four major 
pieces of legislation in the 1960s). 
 66. See Zeynep K. Hansen & Gary D. Libecap, Small Farms, Externalities, and the Dust 
Bowl of the 1930s, 112 J. POL. ECON. 665, 666, 684 (2004) (discussing the disastrous 
consequences of the Dust Bowl and the eventual government intervention in the late 1930s).  
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federal assistance.67 The Dust Bowl marked a turning point as the public 
recognized the vital role agriculturalists played in providing food supply. 
New Deal policies created agricultural programs designed to minimize 
risk for farmers, including subsidized feed, subsidized crop insurance, 
and financial aid grants.68 The federal government also intervened in 
commodity markets to stabilize supply and demand. Successive 
Agricultural Adjustment Acts69 provided grants that incentivized 
agricultural development in arid regions with the knowledge that 
government-backed insurance programs would spread the risk across 
society.70 These policies were not just meant to protect farmers—they 
were designed to prop up entire farming communities.71  
Post-World War II policies created general disaster relief funding 
frameworks, in which governors can request, and the President can grant, 
disaster assistance.72 In the 1970s, the federal government encouraged 
large-scale consolidation of small farms into large agribusinesses, while 
maintaining subsidies, to dramatically increase yields and promote 
agricultural exports.73 For the most part, the pillars of agricultural law and 
policy set in motion in the twentieth century—crop subsidies, 
government-backed insurance, and direct relief payments—are still in 
place today.74 Needless to say, the marijuana industry was not swept up 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See Robert W. Adler, Balancing Compassion and Risk in Climate Adaptation: U.S. 
Water, Drought, and Agricultural Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 201, 245–46 (2012). 
 68. Id. at 247. 
 69. E.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31, invalidated 
by United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 
108-357, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1407 (2012)). 
 70. See Adler, supra note 67, at 250. 
 71. Id. at 253. 
 72. See, e.g., Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (1995)); see also Joanna M. Foster, Oregon, 
Washington Declare States of Emergency as Wildfires Spread, THINKPROGRESS (July 17, 2014), 
https://thinkprogress.org/oregon-washington-declare-states-of-emergency-as-wildfires-spread-a 
afd1a2fee09#.m7eiipg55 (reporting that the federal government has sent the National Guard and 
the National Weather Service to assist states with wildfire problems); Ian Lovett, California 
Approves Forceful Steps amid Drought, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/07/16/us/forceful-steps-amid-a-severe-drought.html?_r=0 (showing an example of 
California legislators approving regulation as assistance for droughts). 
 73. Adler, supra note 67, at 260. 
 74. The Agricultural Act of 2014, which establishes agricultural spending for the next ten 
years, allocates $44.4 billion for commodity programs and $90 billion for crop insurance. The 
government distributed disaster relief funds a week after the Act was signed into law, including 
$100 million for livestock losses in California. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 
Stat. 649 (to be codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
Obama Administration Announces Additional Assistance to Californians Impacted by Drought 
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid 
=2014/02/0022.xml; Brad Plumer, The $956 Billion Farm Bill, in One Graph, WASH. POST (Jan. 
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in these initiatives. For the most part, marijuana cultivation in the United 
States for much of the twentieth century was conducted by small-scale 
farmers acting independently (or, more accurately, in violation) of state 
and federal agricultural policies. 
If this assortment of agricultural policies had developed in the 
presence of a legal marijuana industry, there is little reason to believe 
marijuana cultivation would have been any more challenging than the 
regulation of other crops. Regulation by federal agencies like the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA)75 and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA)76 would have been likely, while states may or may 
not have developed marijuana-specific agricultural policies.77 
Preliminary marijuana legalization initiatives have forced agencies to 
consider the marijuana industry anew, but those efforts remain limited.  
A.  Marijuana Cultivation Is an Unregulated Agricultural Activity 
To determine how marijuana will fit into modern regulatory regimes, 
it is necessary to understand how the marijuana industry has evolved on 
the black market. The size of the marijuana industry today, like any 
rooted (at least in part) in  the black market, is notoriously difficult to 
estimate, and there is a lack of peer-reviewed research. A 2006 pro-
marijuana study focused on valuation pegged the total value of domestic 
marijuana production at $35.8 billion.78 If the estimate is accurate, 
marijuana would be the largest cash crop in the United States and a top 
five cash crop in 39 states.79 In 2012 a generalist book on legalization 
questioned those results, claiming the industry production value is closer 
                                                                                                                     
28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/28/the-950-billion-farm-
bill-in-one-chart. 
 75. The FDA regulates prescription and pharmaceutical drugs, among other products 
affecting public health. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-
717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99 (2012)). 
 76. The USDA provides “leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, rural 
development, nutrition, and related issues based on public policy, the best available science, and 
efficient management.” About the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navtype=MA&navid=ABOUT_USDA (last 
modified Oct. 6, 2016).  
 77. In regulated riparian jurisdictions, agencies can issue permits, or legislatures can craft 
laws, in a manner that prefers one use over another, or in some cases, one crop over another. The 
Regulated Riparian Model Water Code, for example, proscribes the following preferences among 
water rights: (1) water for human health; (2) water to protect crops and livestock; and (3) all other 
uses. The latitude agencies and legislatures have to interpret what is a “reasonable use,” which 
may facilitate agricultural favoritism. In Florida, for example, the influence of the citrus industry 
has strained efforts to protect the Everglades. See Stoa, supra note 65, at 83–85. 
 78. See GETTMAN, supra note 24, app. 3b, at 24.  The $35.8 billion figure is based on an 
estimate of over 56 million plants grown annually. 
 79. See id. at 13 & tbl. 7. 
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to $4.3 billion.80 A 2016 study on the nascent legal marijuana market was 
more bullish, finding annual sales of legal products topping $2.7 billion 
and growth outpacing any other industry.81  
As the marijuana industry matures and a greater proportion of its 
economic activities take place in legal markets, more precise estimates 
will become available.  For now, even low estimates make clear that the 
transition from black market to legalized and regulated cultivation will 
transfer a burgeoning agricultural industry into regulatory systems. This 
transfer will not occur all at once. Aggressive taxation of producers and 
consumers of marijuana may keep less expensive black market 
opportunities alive and well.82 In Colorado’s legal marijuana market, an 
estimated 40% of consumers still purchase marijuana on the black 
market, likely due to lower prices.83 While that may be a disappointment 
to law enforcement and tax revenue authorities, administrative agencies 
may benefit from a gradual transition to legalization. And if obtaining the 
necessary agricultural permits is perceived to be excessively onerous by 
farmers, regulations may themselves contribute to the perpetuation of the 
black market.  
What is clear is that marijuana cultivation is an agricultural activity. 
Marijuana can be grown in many different ways, in many different places, 
under many different growing conditions.84 It can be grown indoors or 
outdoors, in arid or humid climates, with rain-fed or irrigated water.85 
Cultivation sites range from one or two plants grown for personal use, to 
small-scale farms, to large-scale “trespass” grows on public lands.86 
                                                                                                                     
 80. JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION 41 (2012); see Michael 
Montgomery, Cal. Watch, Marijuana Not Top U.S. Cash Crop: Book, NBC BAY AREA (Aug. 14, 
2012, 6:14 AM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/New_book_discounts_theory_of_ 
marijuana_as_top_US_cash_crop-166081066.html. 
 81. Jeff Daniels, There’s a New Gold Rush in California as Investors Prep for Pot 
Legalization Vote, CNBC (June 30, 2016, 11:07 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/30/theres-
a-new-gold-rush-in-california-as-investors-prep-for-pot-legalization-vote.html. 
 82. See Robert W. Wood, Feds Propose Taxing Marijuana, True Cash Crop, FORBES (Dec. 
10, 2014, 1:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/12/10/feds-propose-taxing-
marijuana-true-cash-crop/#164a628c35f6. But see JANE G. GRAVELLE & SEAN LOWRY, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R43785, FEDERAL PROPOSALS TO TAX MARIJUANA: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 18 
(2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43785.pdf (“[T]he initial tax rate for legalized 
marijuana could be set low enough to undermine the illicit market . . . .”). 
 83. See Katie Lobosco, Colorado’s Missing Marijuana Taxes, CNN MONEY (Sept. 2, 2014, 
8:01 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/02/news/economy/marijuana-taxes-colorado/index. 
html?section=money_topstories. 
 84. ROBERT CONNELL CLARKE, MARIJUANA BOTANY app. II, at 162–63 (1981).  
 85. Id. 
 86. See Phillip Smith, Federal Bill Would Up Penalties for Marijuana “Trespass Grows,” 
STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG (July 19, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2013/jul/ 
19/federal_bill_would_penalties_mar.  
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Some envision a future dominated by large consolidated farms producing 
generic marijuana.  Because the marijuana industry is so fragmented and 
diverse, it is difficult to paint a picture of marijuana farming that is 
representative of the diversity of cultivation methods.  
Fundamentally, however, marijuana is a plant that must be cultivated 
to produce a market value. Marijuana buds (used to create marijuana 
products) can only be produced when female marijuana plants have not 
been pollenated by male plants, an exceedingly unlikely scenario in the 
wild.87 To provide marijuana products to markets (legal or otherwise), 
therefore, requires human intervention and agricultural activity. This is 
an aspect of the marijuana industry, however, that many states have not 
fully appreciated. For twenty years after the state of California legalized 
medicinal marijuana, the state, to the extent it regulated the marijuana 
industry at all, focused mainly on regulating physicians, patients, and 
dispensaries.88 The state acted as if marijuana appeared out of thin air. Or 
perhaps, the state’s regulatory priorities suggested that marijuana 
agriculture did not need regulation.  
Some states that have legalized the medicinal or recreational use of 
marijuana more recently have shown greater awareness of the agricultural 
component of the marijuana industry, but so far regulations have been 
limited relative to the scope of issues identified in this Article, or in some 
cases, non-existent. In New York, the approach has been dismissive of 
the agricultural component of the marijuana industry. While the state 
passed the Compassionate Care Act legalizing medicinal marijuana in 
2014,89 the law only allowed for five cultivators state-wide.90 The law 
seemingly rejects the concept of marijuana agriculture altogether, 
referring to the process of growing marijuana plants as 
“manufacturing.”91 To the extent the law addresses marijuana 
                                                                                                                     
 87. See Ernest Small & Steve G. U. Naraine, Expansion of Female Sex Organs in Response 
to Prolonged Virginity in Cannabis Sativa (Marijuana), 63 GENETIC RESOURCES & CROP 
EVOLUTION 339, 346 (2016). 
 88. See STEPHEN A. MCEWEN, LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, MEDICAL MARIJUANA—REVISITED 
AFTER NEW STATE LAWS (2016), https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Member-
Engagement/Professional-Departments/City-Attorneys/Library/2016/Spring-2016/5-2016-Spring-
Medical-Marijuana-%E2%80%93-Revisited-After.aspx. 
 89. 2014 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 90 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3360–
69 (McKinney 2014)).  
 90. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3365(9); see also Jesse McKinley, New York State Awards 5 
Medical Marijuana Licenses, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
08/01/nyregion/new-york-state-awards-5-medical-marijuana-licenses.html?_r=0 (discussing the 
companies now allowed to grow and sell medicinal marijuana in New York). 
 91. The bill’s summary begins, “Relates to the medical use of marihuana; legalizes the 
possession, manufacture, use, delivery, transport or administration of medical marihuana by a 
designated caregiver for a certified medical use . . . .” Summary, A.B. A06357, 2013–14 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014). 
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manufacturing at all, it requires that plants be grown indoors.92 This 
approach is flawed in several respects, as it pays little attention to the 
cultivation stage marijuana products must go through.  
Other states have been more realistic about issues surrounding 
marijuana agriculture, though many blind spots remain. Licensing 
producers has been a common feature of these regulatory frameworks, 
and the licensing process may address agricultural issues, but often the 
focus has been limited to pesticide use, cultivation limits, or labelling.93 
In Colorado, for example, a task force established to investigate legal and 
regulatory issues and propose legislative and executive actions 
appropriately identified some agricultural issues,94 such as the need to 
regulate pesticides and waste products, tax cultivators, and establish 
cultivation limits,95 but broader issues central to agricultural development 
(such as water use or permitted cultivation practices) were not addressed.  
While states appear to be aware that the marijuana industry is 
predicated on the cultivation of marijuana plants, the early record of 
marijuana regulations suggests that most states are ill-equipped to address 
marijuana agriculture. That may be due to a lack of institutional 
knowledge on the part of policy makers, which is understandable, but that 
does not excuse states that do not attempt to identify agricultural issues 
in the marijuana industry or develop a regulatory response. 
B.  Tailored Regulations vs. Equal Treatment 
If there has been a trend in marijuana regulation among states that 
have legalized the medicinal or recreational use of marijuana, it has been 
to either reject that marijuana cultivation constitutes agriculture in the 
first place (as in New York),96 or to license cultivators without also 
creating a broader marijuana agriculture regulation framework (as in 
Colorado).97 California has been the only state to acknowledge that 
marijuana cultivation is an agricultural activity and that it requires 
                                                                                                                     
 92.  “Manufacturing of medical marihuana by a registered organization shall only be done 
in an indoor, enclosed, secure facility located in New York state, which may include a 
greenhouse.”  N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3364(8). 
 93. See, e.g., Bryce Pardo, Cannabis Policy Reforms in the Americas: A Comparative 
Analysis of Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay, 25 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 727, 731 (2014).   
 94. COLO. TASK FORCE, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENT 64, at 66–68 
(2013), http://www.colorado.gov/cms/forms/dor-tax/A64TaskForceFinalReport.pdf. 
 95. Pardo, supra note 93, at 731–32. The task force’s recommendations were largely 
adopted by the state legislature and passed in May 2013. See H.B. 13-1317, 69th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013). 
 96. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text (discussing New York’s use of 
“manufacture” instead of a word that represents cultivation or the growing of marijuana). 
 97. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of Colorado 
regulatory regimes to create a broad regulatory framework). 
 
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/1
2017] MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE LAW: REGULATION AT THE ROOT OF AN INDUSTRY 313 
 
agricultural regulations.98 As marijuana regulations are generally in their 
infancy, it is difficult to judge the validity of these approaches. One of 
these difficulties is that few crops share the same biological 
characteristics or legal history as marijuana, so states are starting from 
scratch in their regulatory efforts. But these regulatory struggles raise a 
broader question: Do states need to develop a regulatory framework 
tailored for marijuana agriculture? Perhaps, instead, it would be 
expedient to regulate marijuana like any other crop, using established 
state agricultural policies and institutions. 
Treating marijuana like any other legal agricultural product has some 
advantages. Most states already have extensive regulations in place to 
address farm business organizations; commercial transactions; crop 
insurance; agricultural estate planning; agricultural financing and 
taxation; product safety, storage, and labelling; agricultural workers and 
labor standards; land use and areas zoned for agriculture; and 
environmental challenges such as water use, pesticides, fertilizers, and 
agricultural runoff.99 Some adjustments would be necessary, of course, to 
integrate marijuana agriculture into these frameworks, especially when 
state regulations are intimately connected with federal agricultural laws 
and policies. But it would not be excessively burdensome for state 
agencies addressing these components of the agriculture industry to make 
the necessary adjustments upon legalization and regulate marijuana 
comparably to other crops. Similarly, a farmer growing several crops will 
already be accustomed to those rules and regulations, and it would not be 
impractical for that farmer to incorporate marijuana into their crop 
portfolio and resume business as usual. 
It may be that, in several years or decades, marijuana is regulated like 
other crops. It seems unlikely that New York will continue to restrict 
marijuana cultivation to a small group of five “manufacturers,” for 
example. At least initially, however, as states transition to a legal 
marijuana market, existing frameworks likely cannot accommodate 
marijuana without creating significant regulatory disruptions. As a 
preliminary matter, there is insufficient political will to legalize 
marijuana and treat it like other crops. Because so much regulatory 
attention focuses on where and how marijuana is sold, purchased, and 
consumed, naturally regulators have included marijuana cultivation in 
their tailored regulatory frameworks to maintain oversight of the supply 
chain.100 While that has not induced regulators to consider the full 
                                                                                                                     
 98. A.B. 243, 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).  
 99. The National Agricultural Law Center compiles an index of publications on these and 
other topics pertinent to the regulation of agriculture. See Research Articles, NAT’L AGRIC. L. 
CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/center-publications (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
 100. In some cases, the impulse to maintain oversight has prompted states to require vertical 
integration of the supply chain. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
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spectrum of marijuana-related agricultural issues, it has removed 
marijuana cultivation from the usual regulatory process.  
In addition, where states have restricted the number of farmers 
cultivating marijuana, or the amount of marijuana that each farmer may 
cultivate, they have done so in part to restrict the size of the legal 
marijuana market. This may not affect the size of the overall marijuana 
market—including the black market—and in that respect states may be 
losing out on tax revenues,101 but the objective is not without merit. The 
marijuana industry is large and unwieldy, and regulating the industry 
without help from the federal government is a heavy burden for state 
agencies. In fact, Colorado’s neighboring states have argued to the U.S. 
Supreme Court that Colorado’s legal marijuana products have placed 
undue stress on their own state agencies.102 It is not unreasonable that 
states would seek to gradually incorporate marijuana into their regulatory 
frameworks, and doing so may require tailored regulations that remove 
marijuana from established agricultural regulations. 
Beyond this pragmatic concern, it may not be in the interest of the 
marijuana industry, or the individual states and their marijuana farming 
communities, to treat marijuana indifferently. As discussed below, an 
unrestricted approach may lead to the commoditization of marijuana and 
consolidation of marijuana farms.103 Additionally, because marijuana has 
been a black market agricultural product for decades, it does not enter 
legal frameworks looking like a traditional agricultural product. Many 
marijuana farmers grow their plants indoors, for example, instead of in 
outdoor fields.104  
Moreover, many farmers that cultivate marijuana on the black market 
are not subject to any agricultural rules and regulations. They may not, 
for example, have valid water rights,105 land zoned for agriculture,106 or 
a sophisticated understanding of administrative law and the permitting 
process.107 Subjecting these farmers to the weight of existing regulations 
overnight is within a state’s administrative powers, but that approach may 
come at the cost of alienating those farmers and discouraging them from 
participating in the legal system, perpetuating a robust black-market 
                                                                                                                     
 101. See Lobosco, supra note 83. 
 102. Complaint at 3–4, Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 144). The 
Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Nebraska, 136 S. Ct. at 1034. 
 103. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 104. Indoor growing offers many advantages such as controlled climate, environment, and 
light. ROBERT BERGMAN, THE MARIJUANA GROW BIBLE ch. 2 (2014) (ebook), 
http://www.ilovegrowingmarijuana.com/wp-content/uploads/guides/Ilovegrowingmarijuana.com-
grow-bible.pdf.  
 105. See discussion infra Section III.A.  
 106. See infra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing the custom of growing indoors 
as a result of prohibition). 
 107. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/1
2017] MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE LAW: REGULATION AT THE ROOT OF AN INDUSTRY 315 
 
farming community. If states are to incentivize participation from 
existing marijuana farmers—while creating a framework for marijuana 
agriculture that is responsive to the best interests of states, farming 
communities, and the marijuana industry—a tailored approach that 
provides a gradual transition into existing agricultural regulation 
frameworks may be necessary. 
II.  THE MARIJUANA FRAGMENTATION SPECTRUM: COMMODITIZATION, 
INTEGRATION, OR APPELLATION? 
In 2010, California voters decisively rejected Proposition 19 (the 
Regulate, Control, and Tax Cannabis Act), a measure that would have 
legalized recreational marijuana and commercial cultivation.108 The usual 
arguments against legalization were made by advocates skeptical of the 
marijuana industry, who were concerned about marijuana’s impact on 
public health and safety109 or the inherent regulatory and enforcement 
challenges marijuana legalization presents.110  
What came as a surprise to many, however, was an apparent lack of 
support for legalization from marijuana farming strongholds. In the so-
called “Emerald Triangle” of Mendocino County, Trinity County, and 
                                                                                                                     
 108. Accord California Proposition 19, the Marijuana Legalization Initiative (2010), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_19,_the_Marijuana_ Legalization_ 
Initiative_(2010) (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 109. The Monterey County Herald wrote:  
[W]e fear that a California-only pot industry operating under inconsistent and 
even contradictory rules would create serious crime problems of its own.  
Proposition 19 doesn't set a measurable standard for driving under the influence 
of marijuana, and it could make it much more difficult for employers to bar 
employees from using marijuana even if it might undermine their ability to work 
safely.  
Editorial, Legalized Marijuana Measure Proposition 19 Is the Right Idea, but the Wrong Law, 
MONTEREY CTY. HERALD (Sept. 29, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.montereyherald.com/general-
news/20100929/editorial-legalized-marijuana-measure-proposition-19-is-the-right-idea-but-the-
wrong-law. 
 110. The Santa Rosa Press Democrat wrote: 
Proposition 19 is so poorly worded and filled with loopholes that it’s likely to 
create more confusion than clarity. And, as with Proposition 215, which legalized 
medicinal uses of marijuana, it would still leave California law in conflict with 
federal law, creating more regulatory and policy gridlock at all levels of 
government.  
Pot Measure Is Poorly Worded and Potentially Dangerous, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Sept. 27, 2010), 
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/csp/mediapool/sites/PressDemocrat/News/story.csp?cid=224694
2&sid=555&fid=181. 
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Humboldt County—jurisdictions whose economics are dominated by 
marijuana cultivation—voters were even less enthusiastic about 
Proposition 19 than the state as a whole.111 In Trinity County, barely 40% 
of voters supported the measure.112 The simple narrative that emerged 
was that marijuana farmers were driven by greed: The price of marijuana, 
after all, is inflated on the black market, and having been successful 
operating in the shadows for so long, these farmers were perfectly happy 
to maintain the prohibition status quo.113 
The narrative was misleading but not altogether unfounded. Just as 
many legalization opponents voiced concerns that Proposition 19 was 
vague and would prove difficult to enforce,114 some marijuana farmers 
were concerned that ambiguously worded legalization would lead to a 
proliferation of marijuana conglomerates akin to the tobacco industry.115 
Mass production of marijuana on this scale would threaten to drive out 
California’s fifty thousand marijuana farms116 and replace them with Big 
Ag producers.117  
As California prepared to vote on another marijuana legalization 
measure in November 2016—the Adult Use of Marijuana Act118—
marijuana farmers remained skeptical.119 Fearing the initiative and its 
financial backers are likely to push for commoditization of the marijuana 
                                                                                                                     
 111. Prop. 19: Election Results by County, FRESNO CANNABIS ASS’N, 
http://fresnocannabis.org/prop-19-election-results-by-county (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Thadeus Greenson, Up in Smoke: A Closer Look at How Humboldt Voters Shot 
Down Proposition 19, TIMES-STANDARD (Dec. 9, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.times-
standard.com/article/ZZ/20101209/NEWS/101209406. 
 114. See supra note 110.  
 115. Phil Willon, Only One of California’s Pot Legalization Initiatives Has the Green That 
Counts, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-
marijuana-legalization-california-ballot-20160222-story.html. 
 116. Kate Maxwell, Cannabis Now Considered Agriculture, WILLITZ NEWS (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.willitsnews.com/article/NR/20160210/NEWS/160219981.  
 117. See Rory Carroll, California Marijuana Legalization Faces Unlikely Foe: Growers, 
REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2016, 4:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-marijuana-growers-
idUSKCN1240AF. 
 118. 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 64 (West) (to be codified in scattered sections of CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE).  
 119. See, e.g., Willon, supra note 115. 
Hezekiah Allen of the California Growers Assn., which represents growers and 
other businesses in the cannabis industry, fears the interests influencing this vote 
could wipe out California's small marijuana operations and lead to “big 
marijuana” companies akin to the nation's powerful tobacco giants.  
“We don’t want there to be a Philip Morris of marijuana,” he said.  
Id. 
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industry, support for the initiative remains lukewarm.120 The existential 
struggle exposes one of the most fundamental questions facing the 
marijuana industry: Should states regulate to protect small-scale 
marijuana farmers or allow the industry to consolidate and commoditize? 
On one end of the spectrum, the marijuana industry becomes like the wine 
industry: driven by geography and protected by appellation designations. 
On the other end, marijuana becomes an agricultural commodity: 
indistinct and inexpensive. Contrary to the views of many 
prognosticators,121 the eventual consolidation of the marijuana industry 
is not a foregone conclusion. In this matter, states and local governments 
have a choice to make.  
A.  Marijuana as Agricultural Commodity 
Agricultural commodities are agricultural products that have no 
qualitative differentiation in the marketplace.122 They are fungible and 
treated equally with little regard for where, how, or by whom they were 
produced. As economist Karl Marx wrote, “From the taste of wheat it is 
not possible to tell who produced it, a Russian serf, a French peasant or 
an English capitalist.”123 Commodities are not differentiated by brand, 
quality (or perceived quality), or sustainability of production. Besides 
wheat, other examples include tobacco, rye, barley, oats, cotton, 
soybeans, and rice.124 The commoditization of agricultural products 
allows them to be mass-produced and widely available, increasing supply 
and driving down prices for consumers.125 On the other hand, by making 
products uniform, commoditization makes it difficult for producers and 
consumers to create a market for unique products.126  
The transition from a differentiated product to an undifferentiated 
product is not black and white, because some products retain niche 
                                                                                                                     
 120.  Id. 
 121. The Economist’s February 13, 2016 cover story on marijuana regulation finds the 
emergence of large-scale agricultural companies and consolidation of the industry likely. 
Legalising Cannabis: Reeferegulatory Challenge, ECONOMIST (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21692873-growing-number-countries-are-deciding-
ditch-prohibition-what-comes. 
 122. For a list of agricultural commodities defined in the U.S. Code, see 7 U.S.C. § 1518 
(2012).  
 123. KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1859), 
reprinted in 29 COLLECTED WORKS OF MARX AND ENGELS 257, 270 (2010) (ebook). 
 124. 7 U.S.C. § 1518.  
 125. Commoditize, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commoditize.asp 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2016). 
 126. See Martin Rapaport, Op-ed, Commoditization: Diamond Industry to Establish Fair, 
Open, Competitive Markets, RAPAPORT MAG. (July 2007), http://www.diamonds.net/Magazine/ 
Article.aspx?ArticleID=18283&RDRIssueID=12. 
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markets with unique characteristics, and regulations can intervene to 
create unique markets or prevent products from becoming commodities 
altogether. Eggs, for example, may be somewhere in the middle: some 
consumers view them as fungible and reach for the cheapest eggs 
available,127 while other consumers pay more for eggs produced 
sustainably or ethically.128 States can create parallel markets by 
establishing regulations that impose certain requirements on otherwise 
fungible products. California, for example, requires all eggs sold in the 
state to be laid by hens raised in adequately large pens.129 In the most 
aggressive cases, jurisdictions create appellations for agricultural 
products (such as wine or cheese), providing a protected indication based 
on where or how the product was created.130 
The conventional wisdom is that absent regulation, the marijuana 
industry will come to be dominated by large-scale, mass-produced 
marijuana farms that flood the market with marijuana and drive down 
prices.131 As prices drop, small-scale farming will become unprofitable, 
leading the industry to consolidate into fewer farms cultivating larger 
quantities of marijuana. The U.S. tobacco farming industry has 
experienced a similar process over the past several decades. While 
tobacco farms have traditionally been relatively small due to the labor-
intensive nature of tobacco cultivation, aggregation-friendly policies and 
the emergence of labor-reducing technologies have led to a dramatic 
decline in the number of tobacco farms—in tandem with an increase in 
tobacco acreage per farm.132 The trend toward fewer larger farms has 
made it easier for the industry as a whole to consolidate.133 Left 
unchecked, the marijuana industry may consolidate in similar fashion. 
                                                                                                                     
 127. See, e.g., Annie Baxter, Eggs Are Cheap, the U.S. Is Stepping in to Buy Some, 
MARKETPLACE (Sept. 2, 2016, 4:14 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/2016/09/02/world/ 
depression-era-program-behind-uncle-sams-egg-buys (describing the rise of egg prices and drop 
of demand in eggs after the avian flu). 
 128. See, e.g., Dan Charles, Most U.S. Egg Producers Are Now Choosing Cage-Free Houses, 
NPR (Jan. 15, 2016, 5:26 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/01/15/463190984/most-
new-hen-houses-are-now-cage-free (discussing the higher price of cage-free eggs and how 
“[m]any consumers appear willing to stomach that increase, and the cage-free label has proved 
powerfully attractive”). 
 129. See Shruti Date Singh & Lydia Mulvany, Egg Market Disrupted in U.S. as Cages Made 
Roomier, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2014-12-12/egg-market-disrupted-by-bigger-cages-boosting-price-commodities. 
 130. See, e.g., 27 C.F.R. § 4.25 (2012) (setting rules for appellations of origin). 
 131. See Legalising Cannabis: Reeferegulatory Challenge, supra note 121. 
 132. TOM CAPEHART, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., TRENDS IN U.S. TOBACCO FARMING 3 (2004). 
 133. Ross Hammond, Consolidation in the Tobacco Industry, 7 TOBACCO CONTROL 426, 
426–28 (1998). 
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There is evidence consolidation is taking place within states already,134 
but the truly disruptive force would be federal marijuana legalization that 
permits interstate marijuana commerce. 
While policy makers may consider the costs and benefits of marijuana 
commoditization and consolidation, consolidation of marijuana farms is 
not a given, even in an unregulated environment. While marijuana is 
typically described as a uniform product, in reality the industry cultivates 
hundreds of unique “strains” of marijuana.135 The strains vary in 
appearance, texture, smell, taste, and effect.136 Some have been bred to 
maximize tetrahydrocannabinol (or “THC,” the chemical principally 
responsible for producing psychoactive effects) to produce a stronger 
high.137 The rise of the medical marijuana market, meanwhile, has 
prompted farmers to grow strands that minimize THC while maximizing 
cannabidiol (or “CBD,” a chemical believed to have a variety of medical 
applications).138 In addition, some strains have become de facto branded 
products (e.g., “DJ Short’s Blueberry”),139 while others denote a 
geographic place of origin (e.g., “Dutch Treat”).140  
Many of these strains are challenging to grow and require labor-
intensive, thwarting efforts to mass-produce them.141 Patent law may 
                                                                                                                     
 134. See, e.g., John Ingold, Colorado Medical-Marijuana Businesses Have Declined by 40 
Percent, DENV. POST (Mar. 2, 2013, 12:31 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/03/02/ 
colorado-medical-marijuana-businesses-have-declined-by-40-percent; John Maxfield, The 
Making of Colorado’s Marijuana Millionaires, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 4, 2014, 11:08 AM), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/04/the-making-of-colorados-marijuana-
millionaires.aspx (“[T]he [marijuana] industry is beginning to consolidate around two distinct 
centers of gravity. The first consists of early adopters . . . . The second center of gravity consists 
of newer but deeper-pocketed local entrepreneurs.”). 
 135. See Jason Sawler et al., The Genetic Structure of Marijuana and Hemp, PLOS ONE, 
Aug. 26, 2015, at 1, 2. 
 136. See generally MED. MARIJUANA STRAINS, http://www.medicalmarijuanastrains.com/ 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2016) (providing a description of various strains of medical marijuana based 
on several factors including appearance, smell, taste, and effect). 
 137. T. Kid, The Quest to Grow the World’s Most Powerful Pot, VICE (Apr. 10, 2015, 12:00 
AM), http://www.vice.com/read/marijuanas-growers-are-upping-the-thc-ante-with-super-potent-
pot-456. 
 138. See Sarah Jacoby, Why THC Isn’t the Only Thing in Weed That Matters, REFINERY29 
(Aug. 26, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/2015/08/92201/cbd-medical-marijuana-
facts#.7i9f2t:fDGW; The Rapid Rise in CBD Interest, LEAFLY MARKETWATCH, 
https://www.leafly.com/news/industry/leafly-marketwatch-the-rapid-rise-in-cbd-interest (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2016). 
 139. DJ Short Blueberry, LEAFLY, https://www.leafly.com/indica/dj-short-blueberry (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2016). 
 140. Dutch Treat, LEAFLY, https://www.leafly.com/hybrid/dutch-treat (last visited Dec. 22, 
2016). 
 141. Ana Campoy, The Pot Business Suffers Growing Pains, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2013, 
4:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324345804578426963236807452.  
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create additional hurdles for commoditization. The one-year on-sale rule 
of patent law would likely preclude existing strains from being 
proprietary,142 and generic cultivation signals a move toward 
commoditization. But farmers may be able to patent new marijuana 
strains in the future,143 and the experimentation and patenting of future 
strains may leave room for innovative breeders and intrepid farmers to 
continue providing unique products that frustrate the commoditization of 
marijuana.  
Recalling that commoditization lies on a spectrum, one can accept that 
the industry will accommodate large-scale farming methods while 
leaving room for small-scale farming and unique specializations. Hemp 
products (e.g., textiles or paper) appear to fit the mold of an agricultural 
commodity, for example.144 But many states have shown an inclination 
toward protectionism in the marijuana industry that further distances the 
possibility of commoditization and consolidation. In New Mexico, for 
example, state law requires that medical marijuana sold to patients be 
grown in New Mexico,145 preventing out-of-state cultivators from 
flooding the New Mexico market with generic marijuana. Attempts to 
acquire marijuana businesses by out-of-state or out-of-country companies 
have also met with public backlash.146 Washington has stringent 
residency requirements for marijuana license holders.147 And Colorado 
has enacted similarly protective policies.148  
Federalism, more than protectionism, may spur marijuana import bans 
and residency requirements: Interstate distribution of marijuana falls 
more clearly under the province of federal regulation, and the Justice 
Department has articulated enforcement priorities under the Controlled 
Substances Act that include interstate marijuana commerce.149 But these 
protectionist policies are setting precedent and expectations, and perhaps 
more importantly, creating individual state industries whose interests 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 55 (1998).  
 143. See Hilary Bricken, The Possibility of Marijuana Plant Patents, ABOVE LAW (July 6, 
2015, 4:20 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/07/the-possibility-of-marijuana-plant-patents/ 
?rf=1; Jonathan M. Purow, Planting the Seeds for IP Protection of Marijuana Brands, LAW360 
(Dec. 22, 2015, 10:31 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/733611/planting-the-seeds-for-ip-
protection-of-marijuana-brands. 
 144. RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32725, HEMP AS AN AGRICULTURAL 
COMMODITY 1 (2015).   
 145. Joey Peters, Consolidating and Cashing in on Medical Marijuana, N.M. POL. REP. (May 
8, 2015), http://nmpoliticalreport.com/3522/consolidating-and-cashing-in-on-medical-marijuana 
DEA. 
 146. Id. 
 147. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-020 (2016). 
 148. Maxfield, supra note 134. 
 149. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Announces Update to Marijuana Enforcement Policy (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/justice-department-announces-update-marijuana-enforcement-policy. 
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may be politically difficult to ignore if the federal prohibition is lifted. In 
jurisdictions where marijuana cultivation is economically significant or 
even dominant—such as Humboldt, Mendocino, and Trinity counties—
policy makers will receive significant pressure to avoid commoditization 
and consolidation of the industry. Early adopting states that are taking on 
the risk of legalization may especially want to ensure the benefits stay in-
state. It would be unusual for a state to require an agricultural product be 
grown in-state or to impose residency requirements on cultivators, but 
given the unique state-by-state history of marijuana legalization, 
regulations to prevent fluid commerce and consolidation of cultivation 
are not inconceivable.  
B.  Conglomerates as Regulatory Transition Mechanism 
The long history of small-scale marijuana farming in California may 
influence the movement toward limiting farm size and mass-production 
of marijuana in the state.150 In states without such a history, allowing or 
even encouraging large-scale cultivation may be attractive. In fact, 
several states have considered regulations limiting marijuana farming to 
a select group of large-scale operators. These consolidation-by-design 
proposals would not allow a small-scale marijuana farming culture to take 
root, but they do offer a significant advantage to regulators. By limiting 
the number of legal cultivators, states can more easily monitor the 
industry and enforce regulations.   
While California struggles to regulate tens of thousands of marijuana 
farms, states like Florida,151 New York,152 and Ohio153 would limit 
cultivation licenses to less than a dozen. This type of approach has 
benefits.  It allows the state to carefully select responsible cultivators, 
makes it easy to monitor cultivation, and buys time before presumably 
shifting to a more participatory model. With so few cultivators, states can 
lavish regulatory attention on the licensees to ensure compliance, or craft 
site-specific rules depending on the needs and cultivation infrastructure 
of the operation.154 And in a sense the system is predictable by making it 
clear that only a select number of businesses may cultivate marijuana.  
                                                                                                                     
 150. See Harkinson, supra note 10.  
 151. FLA. STAT. § 381.986(5)(b) (2016). 
 152. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3365(9) (McKinney 2016); see also Catherine Rafter, New 
York State Just Granted Five Medical Marijuana Licenses, OBSERVER (July 31, 2015, 3:00 PM), 
http://observer.com/2015/07/new-york-state-just-granted-five-medical-marijuana-licenses/. 
 153. Medical Marijuana and Personal Use Amendment, Initiative Petition to Ohio Atty. Gen. 
(Feb. 13, 2015). 
 154. In principle, states can tailor any number of water or agricultural permits, but there is a 
limit to how extensive the specifications can be when administering large volumes of permit 
applications. See Gary D. Lynne et al., Water Permitting Behavior Under the 1972 Florida Water 
Resources Act, 67 LAND ECON. 340, 340, 348 (1991).  
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There are two major drawbacks to this model. First, it is hard to find 
equity or public support when the state permits only a small handful of 
cultivators to participate in the market. Ohio’s 2015 constitutional 
amendment initiative to legalize marijuana included a list of landowners 
who would have had exclusive rights to cultivate marijuana in the state.155 
The attempt to control the market prompted some legislators to introduce 
a constitutional amendment of their own that would prohibit the state’s 
constitution from being used to create economic monopolies,156 while 
even some pro-marijuana legalization advocacy groups urged voters to 
reject the initiative.  Voters did reject the legalization monopoly initiative 
(which lacked support from some pro-legalization groups) while 
approving the anti-monopoly amendment.157   
Even if the state transitions to a more permissive model, the 
previously licensed cultivators will have a potentially inequitable leg-up 
on the competition. And while the state may have developed the capacity 
to create site-specific regulations under the exclusive model, those 
capacities would be less relevant when cultivation proliferates and a more 
comprehensive regulatory approach is needed.  
More importantly perhaps, severe limitations on the issuance of 
cultivation licenses ignore the existence and persistence of black market 
cultivators. If marijuana cultivation were not occurring to begin with or 
were unlikely to take root, a limited licensing approach might be sensible 
in some states. But marijuana is widely available in part because domestic 
cultivation is increasing across the United States, particularly on private 
lands.158 With legalization efforts gaining momentum and spreading 
knowledge on cultivation methods, it seems unlikely that marijuana 
cultivation will remain dormant for long even in states that currently lack 
a meaningful marijuana farming presence. Considering the size and 
growth of the marijuana industry, eradication of unlicensed marijuana 
                                                                                                                     
 155. The amendment’s text included the tax parcel numbers of the properties in question: 
Subject to the exceptions set forth herein, there shall be only ten MGCE facilities, 
which shall operate on the following real properties: (1) Being an approximate 
40.44 acre area in Butler County, Ohio, identified by the Butler County Auditor, 
as of February 2, 2015, as tax parcel numbers Q6542084000008 and 
Q6542084000041 . . . .  
Medical Marijuana and Personal Use Amendment, supra note 153. 
 156. H.R.J. Res. 4, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015).  
 157. Matt Pearce, Ohio Voters Soundly Reject Marijuana Legalization Initiative, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 3, 2015, 7:51 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ohio-marijuana-results-
20151103-story.html. 
 158. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 
SUMMARY 25 (2014).  
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cultivators is unlikely.159 Limiting cultivation to a small handful of 
businesses offers transitional benefits but is unlikely to be a sound long-
term solution. 
C.  Vertical Integration of the Supply Chain 
An alternative method of regulatory oversight over cultivation 
requires the chain of supply to be vertically integrated. In other words, 
marijuana farmers must sell what they grow, and dispensaries must grow 
what they sell. There are significant advantages of the vertical integration 
model for regulators. Most importantly, vertical integration reduces the 
number of marijuana businesses in operation and makes it easier to track 
the supply chain from seed to sale. There are advantages for marijuana 
businesses as well—vertical integration may increase profit margins by 
reducing the number of profit-seeking firms in the supply chain, while 
allowing for more control over inventory. High barriers to entry are 
advantageous for businesses that have already overcome the barriers, 
after all.  Vertically-integrated businesses may also cut down on 
redundant business expenses. Vertical integration is mandatory in 
Massachusetts,160 Maine,161 New Jersey,162 New Hampshire,163 and New 
Mexico.164 
But mandatory vertical integration has its drawbacks. It is 
significantly more expensive to finance a business that incorporates the 
cultivation, post-production, and retail sale of marijuana. By some 
estimates, it can be three to ten times more expensive to establish a 
vertically-integrated marijuana business than a retail dispensary.165 More 
human resource expertise is required to handle a diversity of marijuana 
business activities.166 And wedding each stage of the supply chain 
together increases risk: Failure in any one aspect of the business is likely 
to affect the other aspects as well.167 In general, it is unusual to require 
vertical integration, and the marijuana industry is one of the only sectors 
                                                                                                                     
 159. The Drug Enforcement Administration has described the shift in cultivation practices 
toward private lands as an obstacle to law enforcement and eradication. Id. at 26. 
 160. 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 725.105(N)(1)–(2) (2016).  
 161. 10-144-122 ME. CODE R. § 6.29 (LexisNexis Nov. 2016). 
 162.  N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:64-9.1 to 9.3 (2009) (permitting approved alternative treatment 
centers to cultivate, grow, harvest and sell their own marijuana). 
 163.  H.R. 573-FN, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013) (similar to New Jersey, does not 
include purchase as an acceptable activity by an alternative treatment center). 
 164. N.M. CODE R. § 7.34.4.8(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2015) (focusing on the amount of plants a 
non-profit producer is permitted to grow, but does allow for usable cannabis trade from other 
licensed producers). 
 165. 4FRONT PUBL’G, PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 2 (2015). 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
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in which this occurs.168 
Washington prohibits vertical integration.169 Cultivators cannot hold 
dispensary licenses, while dispensaries cannot hold cultivation licenses. 
The model is similar to regulation of the alcohol industry, with its 
mandatory delineation between producers, distributors, and retailers.170 
The idea is that by breaking up supply chain integration, businesses have 
less incentive to promote alcohol or drug abuse, and each group can focus 
on providing goods and services in its area of specialization.171 The model 
has had limited success in the alcohol industry, where distributors have 
become powerful middlemen and may be dampening the potential for 
innovation.172 
Other states, recognizing the costs and benefits, have opted to allow, 
but not require, vertical integration. Nevada has adopted this approach,173 
while Colorado has abandoned its initial vertical integration 
requirement.174 Considering the nascent state of the marijuana industry, 
it may be useful to allow a diversity of approaches to collect evidence on 
how the industry might grow and stabilize in the future. The same can be 
said about regulating the industry as well, however: There is value in 
letting states experiment with a diversity of regulatory approaches.  
Vertical integration is likely to have particular implications on the 
agricultural component of the marijuana industry. Where required, it will 
make cultivation one component of a broader marijuana business, while 
reducing the likelihood that marijuana can become one of several crops 
grown on a single farm. More and more farmers growing traditional crops 
are considering incorporating marijuana into their crop portfolio,175 but 
in states where vertical integration is mandatory it seems unlikely that 
these farmers will want to devote their resources to post-production and 
retail in order to do so. The effect is that the marijuana industry remains 
introverted, minimally engaged with the broader agricultural community. 
On the other hand, the supply of marijuana is presumably less likely to 
                                                                                                                     
 168. Id. 
 169. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.328 (2012). 
 170. See 4FRONT PUBL’G, supra note 165, at 2. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 3.  
 173. NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.056 (2015) (allowing retailers, cultivators, and in limited 
cases, users to produce usable marijuana). 
 174. See John Ingold, Colorado Lawmakers Question Proposed Marijuana Business Rules, 
DENV. POST (Mar. 21, 2013, 5:33 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/03/21/colorado-
lawmakers-question-proposed-marijuana-business-rules. 
 175. See, e.g., Rob Hotakainen, With No Federal Water, Pot Growers Could Be High and 
Dry, MCCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU (2014) (Apr. 27, 2014, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article24766780.html (describing a 
cantaloupe famer in Washington who has applied to grow marijuana). 
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fluctuate wildly relative to its demand if farmers are required to sell what 
they grow. By tying cultivation and retail together, both activities may be 
more responsive to each other.  
Finally, vertical integration may increase market consolidation. The 
financial and human resources needed to establish an integrated 
marijuana business and navigate each supply chain component’s 
regulatory requirements may create such a high barrier to entry that 
small-scale farmers are shut out, leaving only a select few capital-rich 
businesses to dominate the market. In the early years of Colorado’s 
medical marijuana market when vertical integration was required, the 
regulatory requirements were so onerous that over a third of operators 
went out of business.176  
Nonetheless, vertical integration brings both promising benefits and 
concerning costs. It is a unique regulatory approach in an agricultural and 
commercial sense, but not one without a rationale, and several states have 
taken proactive measures to adopt or reject integration. As states 
transition toward legalization and work to refine their regulatory systems, 
vertical integration promises to be a contentious policy consideration. 
D.  The Promise of Marijuana Appellations 
In response to fears that legalization will lead to commoditization of 
the marijuana industry and a consequent influx of generic marijuana that 
runs small-scale farmers out of business, some jurisdictions have 
proposed adopting appellations for marijuana cultivation.177 An 
appellation is a certified designation of origin that may also require that 
certain quality or stylistic standards be met.178 Appellations are most 
commonly associated with the wine industry, but they can be applied to 
any agricultural or food product in which the geographic origin carries 
                                                                                                                     
 176. See Ingold, supra note 134; Tim Sprinkle, For Cannabis Entrepreneurs, Industry 
Expansion Brings Growing Pains, YAHOO FIN. (Mar. 11, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/ 
news/marijuana-industry-faces-growing-pains-amid-consolidation--growth-214432335.html. 
 177. Neither the state of California nor Humboldt County has established an appellation 
system, but Humboldt County’s Marijuana Ordinance establishes an artisanal labelling program, 
and interest groups representing the marijuana industry have advocated for a more robust 
appellation system to protect the Humboldt County brand. Interview with Anonymous Member 
of the California Cannabis Voice Humboldt, in Arcata, Cal. (Sept. 10, 2015). 
 178. In the wine industry, for example, the appellation system in the United States is only 
concerned with geography, while the European Union’s appellations typically require more 
stringent standards be met. See Warren Moran, The Wine Appellation as Territory in France and 
California, ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 694, 697 (1993) (comparing appellation systems 
in France and California); see also David E. R. Gay & Ralph B. Hutchinson, A Comparative 
Analysis of French and U.S. Wine Appellations, ATLANTIC ECON. J., Dec. 1987, at 99, 99 (arguing 
that U.S. appellations have no consistent unifying structure, while French practices are 
systematic). 
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importance.179 The wine industry’s model rests on the assumption that 
environmental conditions (soil, aridity, temperature, etc., collectively 
known as the “terroir”180) influence grape quality, and there is general 
agreement that this assumption has merit.181 Designation requirements 
that have quality standards also tend to increase the quality of grapes 
grown in the appellation, improving wine quality and the region’s 
reputation.182As the reputation of a region’s agricultural product grows, 
the appellation designation creates a unique market for the product, 
increasing prices while precluding other producers from free-riding on 
the region’s reputation or duplicating its products.183 Appellations 
therefore create differentiation in the marketplace, frustrating efforts to 
commoditize the industry with one generic product.184 Protectionism of 
local industries and their brands (e.g., Champagne, France) has a 
secondary benefit. By certifying that products with geographic indicators 
are accurately designated, consumers are assured of authenticity and are 
more likely to pay more for higher quality products. These twin goals of 
providing economic benefits and consumer protection underlie the basic 
motivations of most appellation systems.185 
The appellation model may be well-suited to the marijuana industry 
for several reasons. First, there is some merit to the claim that 
environmental conditions influence marijuana quality, and would 
therefore provide a basis for place-of-origin designations.186 Marijuana 
farming has become so widespread in northern California in part because 
growing conditions there are ideal. While California is known for being 
an infamously arid state, in reality the problem is distributional: while 
almost all of its population is located to the south, most of the state’s 
                                                                                                                     
 179. See Mary Murphy, What Does “AOC” Mean and What Does It Say About a Cheese?, 
FORMAGGIO KITCHEN (June 18, 2010), http://www.formaggiokitchen.com/blog/what-does-aoc-
mean-and-what-does-it-tell-us-about-a-cheese.  
 180. Terroir, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WINE 700 (Jancis Robinson ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
 181. Michael Maher, Comment, Vino Veritas? Clarifying the Use of Geographic References 
on American Wine Labels, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (2001). 
 182. Geographical Delimitation, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WINE, supra note 180, at 
229, 229. 
 183. See Jay Kiiha, Trade Protectionism of Wine Brand Names at the Expense of American 
Viticultural Areas: Arbitrary Protection of “Big Liquor” at the Expense of Small Vineyards, 9 
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 157, 159 (2004). Of course, the model also fosters fraud as lesser or outside 
cultivators attempt to claim a region as their own, or simply confuse the consumer. Id. at 168. 
 184. Christopher A. Bartlett & Sumantra Ghoshal, Going Global: Lessons from Late Movers, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.–Apr. 2000), https://hbr.org/2000/03/going-global-lessons-from-late-
movers.  
 185. See Maher, supra note 181, at 1885–86. 
 186. See Cannabis Terroir 101: What Is It, and What Factors Affect It?, LEAFLY, 
https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-101/cannabis-terroir-outdoor-growing/ (last visited Jan. 
26, 2017). 
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water resources were historically located north of Sacramento.187 As a 
double bonus, California’s northern counties are dry during the summer 
growing season, when excess precipitation and humidity might dampen 
and spoil marijuana crops.188  The strains being developed and cultivated 
in northern California are therefore well-adapted to these unique growing 
conditions. 
In Jamaica, by contrast, marijuana farmers traditionally used genetic 
strains that were accustomed to tropical humidity and temperatures, 
cultivating marijuana with their own unique characteristics.189 Seed 
companies regularly market their strains to match a diversity of outdoor 
conditions.190 Instead of competing with each other to produce the most 
popular generic strains, appellations would allow regions to embrace the 
strains that grow well in their environment. France’s Burgundy and 
Rhône regions are well-known for growing pinot noir and syrah grape 
varietals, respectively.191 Neither region is threatened by outside 
producers or forced to adopt ill-suited varietals because they have created 
individual markets for their own well-respected grapes. The same could 
be true of marijuana producing regions. 
The economic incentive to provide monopolistic protections and 
marketing power to appellation regions is, without doubt, of particular 
interest to the marijuana industry. Counties that have developed robust 
marijuana farming industries may feel that the influx of mass-produced 
generic marijuana that would come from national legalization may wipe 
out their existing small-scale farmers. Appellations can protect the brand-
name associated with a region, as well as the farmers that make the region 
economically productive. An appellation system could ensure that only 
marijuana grown in Humboldt County, California carries with it the 
Humboldt County designation. In addition, marijuana appellations can 
                                                                                                                     
 187. Measurements taken between 1894 and 1947 showed the region north of Sacramento—
including Mendocino, Trinity, and Humboldt counties—contained 73% of the state’s water 
resources. Gordon R. Miller, Shaping California Water Law, 1781 to 1928, 55 S. CAL. Q. 9, 9 
(1973).  
 188. As discussed below, this can create water allocation problems if water storage during 
fallow seasons is insufficient. See Bauer et al., supra note 13, at 17. 
 189. While there are myriad problems with the Jamaican marijuana industry, and little 
research on the subject, anecdotal evidence indicates that indigenous strains are well adapted and 
can produce quality marijuana. See Pete Brady, Ganja Gardens, CANNABIS CULTURE (Oct. 25, 
2002), http://www.cannabisculture.com/content/2002/10/25/2412. 
 190. See, e.g., Cannabis Seeds for Cool Climate, Barneys Farm Seeds, BARNEYS FARM SHOP, 
https://www.barneysfarmshop.com/barneys-farm-seeds/outdoor-cannabis-seeds/cool-climate.html 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2017); Outdoor Cannabis Seeds, SENSI SEEDS, 
https://sensiseeds.com/en/cannabis-seeds/outdoor (last visited Jan. 25, 2017). 
 191. See Main Grape Varieties by European Wine Region, 1855 CONSULTING, 
https://1855consulting.com/news-articles/main-grape-varieties-by-european-wine-region/ (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2017). 
 
31
Stoa: Marijuana Agriculture Law: Regulation At The Root Of An Industry
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
328 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
 
adopt specific standards that collectively enhance the quality and 
reputation of their region. In France, for example, wine appellations can 
require that vineyards only use certain varietals, limit irrigation practices 
that increase yields at the cost of grape quality, or attain a predetermined 
alcohol content.192 These requirements make production more 
challenging, and in some cases may stifle creativity and innovation, but 
the requirements collectively increase the region’s overall product. Many 
of these practices could be applied to marijuana cultivation as well.  
Of course, this model would benefit from a broadly inclusive (i.e., 
transboundary) regulatory framework in order to be effective. The United 
States wine industry’s appellations are regulated by the Treasury 
Department’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB, a 
federal agency),193 but the TTB is unlikely to establish a national 
appellation system for marijuana if cultivation remains illegal under 
federal law. States can develop their own appellation regulation 
frameworks, however, and as long as states maintain import and export 
bans (likely in the short-term given federal interstate commerce 
enforcement concerns) those state regulations may prove to be 
sufficiently effective. State appellation regulations may even prove 
resilient if the federal prohibition is lifted and a federal agency regulates 
the industry.194  
Nonetheless, it would be challenging for individual counties or local 
government bodies to enforce their own appellation designations if other 
jurisdictions do not follow suit. Enforcement of geographic indicators 
outside of the regulatory body’s jurisdiction is notoriously difficult. In 
one infamous case, it took fourteen years and a trade mission for the Napa 
Valley Vintners Association to convince the Chinese government to grant 
protected status to the term “Napa.”195 While the marijuana industry is 
increasingly mobilized and represented through interest groups,196 it will 
be challenging to persuade jurisdictions to recognize geographic 
indicators without the assistance of a broader regulatory framework. Still, 
local attempts to create appellations can generate momentum and set 
precedent for other jurisdictions to replicate the model. It is not a given 
                                                                                                                     
 192. Daniel W. Gade, Tradition, Territory, and Terrior in French Viticulture: Cassis, 
France, and Appellation Contrôlée, 94 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 848, 852 (2004). 
 193. 27 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2016).  
 194. See Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 425 (Cal. 2004) (finding that a more 
restrictive state wine labelling statute is not preempted by federal regulations).  
 195. Laura Zanzig, The Perfect Pairing: Protecting U.S. Geographical Indications with a 
Sino-American Wine Registry, 88 WASH. L. REV. 723, 724–25 (2013). 
 196. For example, the Cannabis Club Voice Humboldt and Emerald Growers Association 
represent marijuana farmers in northern California. See Peter Hecht, California Marijuana Market 
Readies for “Robust” New Era, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 18, 2015, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/california-weed/article39804690.html. 
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that the TTB will establish marijuana appellation regulations upon 
legalization, but farmers and state and local governments can make that 
more likely by creating the foundations for regulation. 
The second incentive to create appellations—providing consumer 
protection—is equally compelling in the marijuana industry. Because 
marijuana has been (and in many jurisdictions continues to be) cultivated 
on the black market, consumers have traditionally had little to no 
information regarding where or how their marijuana was grown. This 
does not reflect consumer preferences, of course. It is notoriously difficult 
to determine the origin of marijuana even in the aggregate,197 but by one 
estimate two-thirds of marijuana consumed in the United States came 
from Mexico in 2008.198 Given the well-publicized violence and 
corruption associated with Mexican drug cartels,199 it is not unreasonable 
to believe consumer behavior would reflect a preference for domestically 
grown marijuana if reliable geographic designations were provided to the 
consumer. Given marijuana’s illicit dimensions, marijuana appellations 
can provide some assurance of authenticity and ethical cultivation. There 
is evidence that legal marijuana cultivation in the United States is driving 
“cartel grows” out of business;200 appellations can continue that trend by 
providing consumers with choices that meet their standards in similar 
fashion. 
Appellations can provide consumers with more information than place 
of origin as well. The requirements common in French wine appellations 
mentioned above (e.g., restricting supply, eligible varietals, or alcohol 
content) are not only collectively beneficial to the region’s producers, 
they also provide more information to the consumer.201 Considering how 
many strains of marijuana are in existence, there is value in a regulatory 
framework that easily and reliably communicates important 
characteristics to consumers, such as the strain and its THC or CBD 
                                                                                                                     
 197. See, e.g., Jon Gettman, Lost Taxes and Other Costs of Marijuana Laws, DRUG SCI., 
http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr4/5Supply.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2017) (discussing 
the different methods used to estimate the amount of marijuana in the United States). 
 198. Deborah Bonello, Mexican Marijuana Farmers See Profits Tumble as U.S. Loosens 
Laws, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-
fg-mexico-marijuana-20151230-story.html (referring to the estimation of Beau Kilmer, co-
director of the Rand Corp. Drug Policy Research Center). Other estimates complicate the picture, 
claiming that by 2010 approximately 80% of marijuana consumed in the United States came from 
California. E.g., Emily Brady, How Humboldt Became America’s Marijuana Capital, SALON 
(June 30, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/30/how_humboldt_became_ 
americas_marijuana_capital/. 
 199. See, e.g., William Neuman, As Drug Kingpins Fall in Mexico, Cartels Fracture and 
Violence Surges, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/world/ 
americas/as-mexico-arrests-kingpins-cartels-splinter-and-violence-spikes.html?_r=1. 
 200. See Bonello, supra note 198. 
 201. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.  
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levels. 
There is reason to question the appellation model’s suitability for 
marijuana agriculture. Perhaps the most apparent obstacle is the fact that 
a significant percentage of marijuana is grown indoors. Since outdoor 
cultivation was risky during prohibition, the marijuana industry has a 
long track record of, and experience with, indoor cultivation. Growing 
indoors now offers advantages beyond privacy, allowing farmers to 
manipulate growing conditions such as soil content, air temperature, and 
light energy to maximize yields.202 As one might expect, however, 
growing indoors makes the “terroir,” or geographic elements, much less 
relevant.  
However, appellations can still facilitate the creation of unique 
localized markets if regions adopt their own growing standards. The 
marijuana industry has come under intense scrutiny on account of the 
energy demands of indoor agriculture,203 and appellations could require 
indoor operations to meet clean energy standards. One county has already 
required indoor farms to use exclusively renewable energy sources (such 
as solar panels, ironically).204 Appellations could also provide incentives 
for farmers to transition to, and embrace, outdoor cultivation by providing 
the geographic indicator protection (and its economic benefits) solely to 
outdoor marijuana farms. 
While appellations would frustrate efforts to commoditize marijuana, 
an appellation system would not preclude consolidation. The U.S. wine 
industry has been experiencing rapid consolidation despite a robust 
origin-focused appellation system.205 The number of small-scale 
vineyards has remained stable, however indicating a strong market for 
unique wines.206 And it may be that consolidation is facilitated by the fact 
that U.S. appellation designations are only concerned with geographic 
origin, and do not impose quality or cultivation standards on producers. 
In any case, the benefits of a marijuana appellation system are sufficient 
to justify consideration, if not adoption. Especially in regions concerned 
that mass-produced generic marijuana will have devastating economic 
consequences for small-scale farmers, finding ways to differentiate 
products and generate market value will be an important policymaking 
objective. A marijuana appellation system may provide the regulatory 
framework needed to achieve that objective. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 202. BERGMAN, supra note 104, at ch. 2. 
 203. See discussion infra Section III.C.  
 204. HUMBOLDT, CAL., CODE tit. III, div. 1, ch. 3, § 313-55.4 (2016). 
 205. Rachael Goodhue et al., California Wine Industry Evolving to Compete in the 21st 
Century, 62 CAL. AGRIC. 12, 16 (2008). 
 206. Id. 
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III.  REGULATING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF 
MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE 
The underlying premise of this Article is that states that have legalized 
marijuana, or are transitioning toward legalization, have focused their 
regulatory attention on issues like taxation, public health, and retail 
licensing, at the expense of agricultural issues raised by marijuana 
legalization. The environmental impacts of marijuana agriculture 
exemplify this premise. Marijuana plants require significant quantities of 
water resources, and it is not clear that existing water laws or regulations 
can accommodate the marijuana industry or regulate the water resource 
impacts to both quantity and quality. The prevalence of indoor growing 
operations, meanwhile, requires inordinate energy resources and creates 
a disturbing carbon footprint. Energy demands are so great that energy 
markets in some states are being strained and the viability of indoor 
marijuana farming called into question.207 Without regulatory 
requirements or market-based certificate programs that recognize and 
reward sustainable marijuana farming, farmers have few incentives to 
exercise restraint. Finally, the federal marijuana prohibition prevents the 
marijuana industry from enjoying government programs that provide 
support to farmers in times of environmental stress. Without crop 
insurance or disaster relief programs, marijuana farmers remain 
vulnerable to extreme events.  
A.  Regulating Water Allocations 
In the winter of 2015, I started researching the relationship between 
marijuana farming and state water laws. In March of that year, the first 
credible scientific study of the impacts of cultivation on water resources 
found that the demand for water to irrigate marijuana plants often 
outstripped water supplies.208 Data from the study came from the Eel 
River watershed in northern California.209 In June of 2015, a convoy of 
vehicles carrying enforcement officers from four different counties of 
northern California drove up and into the remote and rugged slopes of the 
Eel River watershed.210 The enforcement officers conducted open-field 
searches on private lands, which was unusual up to this point, and by the 
end of the weeklong “Operation Emerald Tri-County” had confiscated 
                                                                                                                     
 207. See infra notes 260–62 and accompanying text. 
 208. Bauer et al., supra note 13, at 17. 
 209. Id. at 10. 
 210. Andrew Goff, Major Multi-Agency Marijuana Raid in Island Mountain Today, LOST 
COAST OUTPOST (June 22, 2015, 1:38 PM), https://lostcoastoutpost.com/2015/jun/22/major-
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86,578 marijuana plants.211  
“Operation Emerald Tri-County” was the clearest sign yet that the 
rapidly evolving forces of marijuana legalization and water scarcity were 
about to collide. The enforcement officers were not joined by federal 
officials, but rather personnel from the California Department of Fish and 
Wildlife on suspicion of water abuses.212 Later the four counties claimed 
the raid itself was motivated by violations of state water regulations, not 
marijuana cultivation.213 After finding unpermitted streambed alterations, 
diversions, and reservoirs, the officials moved to confiscate the privately 
grown plants.214 
The collision between marijuana legalization and state water laws 
prompted further research that led to a full-length law review article on 
the topic.215 Because the relationship between marijuana and water 
resources is so important for the emerging field of marijuana agriculture 
in general, a brief summary of those research findings is presented here. 
In short, there is some potential for existing water laws to accommodate 
marijuana legalization without requiring regulatory intervention from the 
state,216 but more than likely, states will need to develop a regulatory 
framework (or modify an existing one) that responds to the unique 
demands that legal marijuana cultivation places on water resources and 
water rights.217  
In the American West, states will need to balance the temptation to 
provide marijuana farmers with water access (lest they make illegal 
appropriations or move out-of-state) with existing appropriative rights 
that give priority to senior rights holders.218 The federal Bureau of 
Reclamation will make this particularly difficult as long as the federal 
marijuana prohibition persists, because it has articulated a prohibition 
policy that would prevent marijuana agriculture from appropriating any 
water resources controlled by the Bureau or passing through a Bureau 
facility.219 Notwithstanding the Bureau of Reclamation’s vast influence 
on western water resources, it is unclear if the policy will lead to 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Adam Randall, Tri-County Pot Raids Net 86,578 Plants, UKIAH DAILY J. (June 29, 
2015, 11:10 AM), http://www.chicoer.com/general-news/20150629/tri-county-pot-raids-net-
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 212. See Goff, supra note 210. 
 213. See Randall, supra note 211. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Ryan B. Stoa, Weed and Water Law: Regulating Legal Marijuana, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 
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Weed and Water Law. 
 216. Id. at 616–19. 
 217. Id. at 620.  
 218. Id.  
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meaningful enforcement.220  
Fortunately, most prior appropriation states administer water rights 
through a regulatory agency equipped to address emerging issues 
proactively, without significantly interfering with existing rights.221 The 
prior appropriation doctrine will make it challenging to appease a brand 
new agricultural subsector, but states have more flexibility than strict 
doctrinal applications would suggest. 
Riparian doctrine states (found in the Eastern United States) may have 
a slightly easier time adjusting to legal marijuana cultivation, as riparian 
rights are not fixed but accommodate reasonable uses of shared waters.222 
Regulated riparian states might not have as much flexibility in the short-
term if existing permits allocate all of the available water resources of a 
watercourse, but in the long-term agencies retain the flexibility to shape 
water use in the state by controlling the permit process.223 That flexibility 
could provide ample room for farmers and regulators to maneuver in the 
new marijuana economy. 
In many states the challenges of regulating marijuana water use 
remains theoretical. In California, however, the issue is very real. Water 
is already a scarce and fiercely controlled resource, with a complex 
system of riparian, appropriative, and groundwater rights.224 The various 
water rights regimes in California provide multiple opportunities to create 
or recognize rights to water for marijuana cultivators, but the complexity 
of the system will make it challenging to navigate and capitalize on those 
opportunities. California’s decentralized approach to marijuana 
regulation, meanwhile, is allowing local governments to move in many 
different directions, sometimes at cross-purposes.225 The size of the 
marijuana cultivation industry in California is the largest in the United 
States, and given the scarcity of water resources in the state, a more 
proactive and integrated approach to regulating marijuana irrigation is 
justified and may be explored in the future.226 
Two themes emerged from this study of water law and marijuana 
cultivation. First, theoretical applications of water law to marijuana 
cultivation needs demonstrate that while these doctrines are often 
criticized for being rigid and antiquated, there is room in the law for 
jurisdictions to provide enough water to marijuana farmers that they will 
                                                                                                                     
 220. Id. at 587; see Hotakainen, supra note 175. 
 221. Stoa, supra note 215, at 620. 
 222. Id. at 594. 
 223. Id. at 620. 
 224. Id.; see also Charles J.P. Podolak & Martin Doyle, Conditional Water Rights in the 
Western United States: Introducing Uncertainty to Prior Appropriation?, 51 J. AM. WATER RES. 
ASS’N 14, 14–15 (2015). 
 225. Stoa, supra note 215, at 620; see, e.g., supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text 
(demonstrating the divergent paths for counties in California and Colorado). 
 226. Stoa, supra note 215, at 620; see also Brady, supra note 198.  
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participate in the regulatory process without significantly disrupting 
existing water rights. This is particularly true in jurisdictions that adopt a 
modified or regulatory version of traditional doctrine that softens the 
rigidities of the common law.   
The second theme is that in practice, the initial signs coming from 
states where marijuana cultivation is legal to some degree suggest that 
the theoretical ability of water law doctrine to incorporate marijuana 
cultivation is not sufficient to ensure a smooth or equitable transition. 
There are too many legal ambiguities in both water laws and marijuana 
agriculture laws for the application of both simultaneously to  function 
coherently and consistently. In order to promote sustainable, responsible, 
and legal marijuana cultivation, while administering water rights 
equitably, states will need to adjust their regulatory frameworks to 
address the challenges that marijuana legalization presents. 
Since that study was completed, California passed the Medical 
Marijuana Regulation and Safety Act (MMRSA), with ambitious 
proposals to create comprehensive regulations for marijuana agriculture, 
including water allocation provisions.227 The MMRSA assigns authority 
for various regulatory responsibilities to a variety of state agencies, 
including the Department of Food and Agriculture, Department of Public 
Health, Department of Fish and Wildlife, and the State Water Resources 
Control Board.228 It remains to be seen if the various agencies involved 
in regulating water allocations will be able to coordinate, articulate, and 
enforce clear policies that incentivize participation from marijuana 
farmers while managing water resources sustainably and respecting 
existing water rights holders. Still, the MMRSA is a promising sign that 
states are beginning to take water resource issues seriously and will begin 
to develop regulations that address water allocation. 
B.  Regulating Water Quality and Pesticide Use 
While water quality was not the focus of the study, in many ways the 
distinction between water quantity and water quality is, from a 
hydrological perspective, illogical. When water levels drop, water quality 
often deteriorates as pollutants become less diluted. Conversely, 
introducing pollutants into a water resource reduces the quantity of clean 
water available. In some ways, the common laws for water allocation 
address this relationship—in riparian jurisdictions, water quality impact 
                                                                                                                     
 227. A.B. 243, 2015–16 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); A.B. 266, 2015–16 Gen. 
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can be a factor in determining whether a water use is reasonable;229 while 
in prior appropriation jurisdictions, instream flows (water resources left 
in the waterway to maintain ecological needs or water quality) have been 
recognized as a beneficial water use.230  
For the most part, however, modern water law systems distinguish 
between water quantity and water quality, with some regulations 
addressing water allocations and others addressing water pollution.231 
Just as water allocation laws will need to reconcile tensions between 
marijuana agriculture and water rights, so too will water quality laws need 
to reconcile marijuana agriculture’s impacts on water quality. And 
although research on the topic remains limited, what studies do exist 
suggest that if left unchecked, marijuana agriculture may have significant 
negative impacts on water quality.232  
A 2013 study on wildlife mortality found a link between rodenticide 
found in dead mammals and the density of nearby marijuana farms, 
suggesting that pesticides and fertilizers may be seeping into the broader 
environment, including water resources.233 And the deforestation, land 
terracing, and road building associated with large marijuana grows 
contribute to erosion and sediment loading of streams, according to a 
2012 study of western public lands.234 More research is needed, but there 
is sufficient evidence to conclude that marijuana agriculture produces the 
same three forms of runoff pollution (pesticides, fertilizers, and sediment) 
that have been a problem for agricultural regulation in general.235 On this 
basis, states may consider whether their existing water quality regulations 
are sufficient to address runoff pollution from marijuana agriculture. 
One major difference between water allocation laws and water quality 
laws is that water allocation regulation has traditionally been a state 
function, whereas the federal government has stepped in to regulate water 
quality through enactment and enforcement of the Clean Water Act 
(CWA).236 The CWA declared, “It is the policy of the Congress to 
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of 
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 232. See Carah et al., supra note 15, at 822, 866.   
 233. Thompson et al., supra note 14, at 91, 93. 
 234. See Carah et al., supra note 15, at 824?25  (citing Jim F. Milestone et al., Continued 
Cultivation of Illegal Marijuana in U.S. Western National Parks, PROC. OF THE 2011 GEORGE 
WRIGHT SOC’Y CONF. ON PARKS PROTECTED AREAS & CULTURAL SITES 209, 212 (2012)). 
 235. See id. at 825. 
 236. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012). 
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States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.”237 To implement this 
objective, Congress uses financial incentives238 and the threat of 
preemption239 to obtain state participation and compliance with the Act. 
For example, states may create their own water pollution control plans, 
including state water quality standards, effluent limitations, and 
watercourse-specific designated uses.240 If the state fails to do so, or if its 
standards do not meet federal minimums,241 the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to regulate on behalf of the 
state.242 This rarely happens, in part because Congress provides funding 
for the development of pollution control programs,243 research,244 and 
construction of treatment works,245 a major incentive for state 
participation.  
Unfortunately, the CWA has not been effective at eliminating 
pollution from agricultural runoff, largely because the CWA is not 
designed to address nonpoint source pollution (pollution that does not 
originate from a discrete source).246 Instead of regulating agricultural 
runoff directly, states and the federal government attempt to regulate 
runoff indirectly by funding pollution control programs that enhance 
monitoring or encourage sustainable farming practices.247 These 
collaborative water pollution control programs often involve a diverse set 
of stakeholders that include state and federal agencies, and 
representatives of the agricultural industry.248 A wide variety of policy 
tools and approaches are also available to address agricultural runoff.249 
                                                                                                                     
 237. Id.; see also District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(finding that “Congress carefully constructed a legislative scheme that imposed major 
responsibility for control of water pollution on the states”). See generally Oliver A. Houck, 
Cooperative Federalism, Nutrients, and the Clean Water Act: Three Cases Revisited, 44 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10,426 (2014) (providing an analysis of the CWA and related judicial decisions). 
 238. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1255, 1381 (2012). 
 239. Id. § 1361.  
 240. Id. § 1313. 
 241. Id. § 1313(e)(3)(A). 
 242. Id. § 1361. 
 243. Id. § 1256. 
 244. Id. § 1255. 
 245. Id. §§ 1281–1301. 
 246. See Lara B. Fowler et al., Addressing Death by a Thousand Cuts: Legal and Policy 
Innovations to Address Nonpoint Source Runoff, CHOICES, 2013, at 1, 2, 4; Adena R. Rissman & 
Stephen R. Carpenter, Progress on Nonpoint Pollution: Barriers & Opportunities, 144 DAEDALUS 
35, 43 (2015). 
 247. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). 
 248. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-tmdl (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
 249. See, e.g., Brian M. Dowd et al., Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Policy: 
The Case of California’s Central Coast, 128 AGRIC. ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 151, 152?55 (2008).  
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Fortunately, approaches that encourage stakeholder engagement and 
provide incentives for farmers to participate are precisely what is needed 
in the marijuana agriculture sector. As the marijuana industry has been 
operating in the shadows for decades, marijuana farmers are quite capable 
of evading onerous regulations. At least during the transition to 
legalization, it will be important for states to engage the marijuana 
farming community and tailor regulations to obtain broad-based support 
for regulatory programs.  
Nonetheless, developing effective water quality control programs for 
the marijuana industry will be challenging. First, states may not have 
access to resources or programs fostered by the CWA given the federal 
marijuana prohibition. Although it would be difficult to distinguish 
marijuana-based agricultural runoff from general agricultural runoff, the 
federal government may not support programs that target and legitimize 
marijuana agriculture. In 2010, a Mendocino County, California program 
successfully partnered private growers with county officials to monitor 
plants and facilitate regulatory compliance, but a federal raid and 
subpoena of the program’s paperwork shut it down and broke up the 
partnership.250 A local or state government program that does not 
implicate the federal government would likely avoid federal prosecution 
today, considering Congress passed a bill in December 2014 prohibiting 
the Department of Justice from using federal funds to interfere with state 
implementation of medical marijuana laws,251 which a federal court 
subsequently held protects private individuals and businesses from 
prosecution as well.252 However, many pollution control programs 
receive funding from the federal government and would be more difficult 
to apply to marijuana agriculture than a purely state or local program.253 
Furthermore, because marijuana regulation is so novel across the 
board, water pollution control programs will need to work with other 
governments and regulatory agencies to be effective and complementary. 
In May 2015, one month before “Operation Emerald Tri-County” raided 
marijuana farms in northern California, California’s North Coast 
Regional Water Quality Control Board held a workshop in the area to 
discuss the Board’s proposed water quality regulations for marijuana 
                                                                                                                     
 250. Josh Harkinson, The Landscape-Scarring, Energy-Sucking, Wildlife-Killing Reality of 
Pot Farming, MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/ 
2014/03/marijuana-weed-pot-farming-environmental-impacts. 
 251. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
113-235, tit. V, sec. 538, 128 Stat. 2173, 2217 (2014). 
 252. United States v. Marin All. for Med. Marijuana, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1047?48 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015). 
 253. See, e.g., Clean Water Partnership Loan Program Awards $1.9 Million for Sewer 
Upgrades, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (July 27, 2016), https://www.pca.state.mn.us/ 
news/clean-water-partnership-loan-program-awards-19-million-sewer-upgrades.  
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cultivation.254 The goal was to solicit input from marijuana farmers and 
invite them to participate in a mutually beneficial regulatory scheme.255 
Farmers would be asked to clean up their operations and invest in water 
quality technologies, and in exchange, the Board would give farmers 
cover to address water quality issues openly and legally.256 The workshop 
ended on a promising note,257 but several weeks later, local sheriffs’ 
departments and the California Department of Fish and Wildlife 
conducted the Island Mountain raids targeting farmers allegedly violating 
environmental regulations.258 The incident showed that without a clear 
framework for regulating marijuana cultivation, aspects of marijuana 
regulation like water quality control will suffer from a lack of 
coordination. 
Notwithstanding these challenges, states have experience addressing 
agricultural runoff through adaptable pollution control programs. The 
diversity of regulatory tools and approaches available can and should be 
considered to develop a water pollution control program capable of 
incentivizing participation from marijuana farmers while making 
meaningful reductions in water pollution. 
C.  Energy Use and Indoor Agriculture 
While to some extent the media have chronicled the impact of 
marijuana agriculture on water resources, marijuana’s energy demands 
and carbon footprint have received widespread attention in both the press 
and academic scholarship.259 Growing marijuana indoors requires high-
intensity lighting, ventilation, and climate control systems, all of which 
are energy-intensive.260 A 2012 study found that the energy consumed by 
indoor agriculture alone constitutes 1% of total electricity use in the 
United States, with carbon emissions reaching fifteen million metric 
tons.261 In California, indoor cultivation accounts for 3% of total 
                                                                                                                     
 254. Media Release, Cal. Water Bds., North Coast Water Board to Hold Workshop May 7 
on Marijuana Cultivation (May 4, 2015), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/press_room/press_ 
releases/2015/pr050715_northcoast_fnl.pdf. 
 255. Id.  
 256. See Baumann, supra note 16. 
 257. Id. One farmer noted that “[t]he water board staff are our preferred regulators because 
they don’t carry guns and badges.” Id. 
 258. See supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text. 
 259. Tom Huddleston, Jr., The Booming Pot Industry Is Draining the U.S. Energy Supply, 
FORTUNE (Dec. 21, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/21/marijuana-energy-consumption/; Gina 
S. Warren, Regulating Pot to Save the Polar Bear: Energy and Climate Impacts of the Marijuana 
Industry, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385, 401–08 (2015). 
 260. Evan Mills, The Carbon Footprint of Indoor Cannabis Production, 46 ENERGY POL’Y 
58, 59 (2012).  
 261. Id. 
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electricity use.262 Those estimates are likely obsolete, as many states have 
since legalized the recreational or medicinal use of marijuana. In 
Colorado, indoor marijuana farms comprise almost half of new demand 
for power.263 Power providers and state regulators are scrambling to 
adjust to rapid changes in the energy sector that indoor marijuana 
agriculture has caused.264 
Unsurprisingly, the federal marijuana prohibition complicates energy 
regulation as well. Many utilities receive power from federal energy 
projects or facilities, are regulated directly or indirectly by federal 
agencies, or receive federal funding.265 Accordingly, it is unclear if those 
utilities are legally permitted to provide energy for purposes of marijuana 
cultivation. The uncertainty has prompted some agencies to refrain from 
creating proactive regulations to address the marijuana industry’s energy 
use.266 The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n267 reinforced the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) authority to regulate retail 
electricity (traditionally a state power) if it affects wholesale power 
rates.268 But unlike the Bureau of Reclamation, the FERC has not 
articulated a marijuana policy.269 
Many jurisdictions have begun to address marijuana agriculture, 
however, and these early experiments with energy regulation will prove 
instructive to states as they transition toward legalization. Approaches 
include a mix of sticks and carrots. In Oregon, where marijuana-induced 
energy demand has led to several power outages in recent months, a trust 
provides cash incentives and technical assistance for cultivation 
operations.270 Utilities in Denver, Colorado, and Seattle, Washington, 
similarly provide incentives in the form of efficient lighting upgrades or 
rebate programs.271 
                                                                                                                     
 262. Id. 
 263. Jennifer Oldham, As Pot-Growing Expands, Electricity Demands Tax U.S. Grids, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-
21/as-pot-growing-expands-power-demands-tax-u-s-electricity-grids. 
 264. One Pennsylvania Public Utility Commissioner said, “We are at the edge of 
this . . . . We are looking all across the country for examples and best practices.” Id. 
 265. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US 12 (2011), 
http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-lazar-electricityregulationintheus-
guide-2011-03.pdf. 
 266. Warren, supra note 259, at 411–12. 
 267. 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).  
 268. Id. at 766. 
 269. See supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.  
 270. Melanie Sevcenko, Pot Is Power Hungry: Why the Marijuana Industry’s Energy 
Footprint Is Growing, GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2016, 8:58 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/feb/27/marijuana-industry-huge-energy-footprint. 
 271. Id. 
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Cultivation licensing and the power granted to local governments to 
enact unique marijuana regulations, both common features of early 
marijuana regulation frameworks, provide a fruitful opportunity to 
impose efficiency standards or clean energy requirements on marijuana 
farmers. Boulder, Colorado, and Humboldt County, California, for 
example, require indoor farming operations to obtain 100% of their 
energy needs from renewable energy sources.272 In cases where 
renewable energy is not available to meet the demands of indoor 
operations, Boulder County imposes a tax on consumers (2.16 cents per 
kWh), from which a portion of the revenue funds sustainable marijuana 
cultivation projects and education programs.273 
Another promising approach is to encourage or require indoor 
agricultural operations to schedule their light cycles to coincide with 
periods of low demand for the electrical grid as a whole. Off-peak hours 
typically take place at night, while peak hours occur during the hottest 
periods of the day.274 But to plants grown indoors, outdoor conditions are 
irrelevant, and because off-peak energy is typically less expensive, there 
is reason to believe farmers will be enthusiastic about programs that 
facilitate “smart-metering” of electricity.275 Electricity providers have an 
interest in preventing power shortages and blow-outs, and methods to 
reduce consumption during peak hours are becoming more sophisticated. 
While the Supreme Court’s ruling in FERC v. EPSA reinforced federal 
authority over electricity regulation, the regulatory rule in question was 
designed to support demand-response programs that provide incentives 
for consumers to adjust their consumption patterns.276  
Finally, policies designed to address the energy demands of indoor 
marijuana agriculture can encourage or mandate that marijuana 
agriculture transition to outdoor environments, where solar energy is 
freely obtained. There is no botanical need to grow marijuana plants 
indoors, but farmers who cultivated marijuana during prohibition are 
accustomed to indoor growing techniques, and therefore the practice has 
continued.277 Indoor agriculture allows farmers to manipulate growing 
                                                                                                                     
 272. BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 6-14-8(i) (2017); BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 6-16-
8(i) (2017); Humboldt, Cal., Ordinance 2544 (Jan. 26, 2016). 
 273. See Res. 2014-41, Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs (Boulder, Colo. 2014) (creating the Boulder 
County Energy Impact Offset Fund). 
 274. Presh Talwalker, Save on Electricity Costs by Avoiding Peak Hours, MIND YOUR 
DECISIONS (Aug. 13, 2010), http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2010/08/13/save-on-electricity-
costs-by-avoiding-peak-hours.  
 275. See Warren, supra note 259, at 411. 
 276. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 786 
(2016). 
 277. See, e.g., Sevcenko, supra note 270 (‘“[T]he vast majority of us growers have learned 
indoor as a result of prohibition.”’). 
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conditions in other beneficial ways, however, and in certain climates 
outdoor cultivation would be challenging if not impossible.278 But the 
energy and maintenance costs of indoor agriculture are likely to make 
outdoor agriculture more enticing as the industry matures. The 2012 
energy study estimated that electricity costs for indoor marijuana totaled 
$6 billion.279 Outdoor marijuana cultivation creates significant energy 
demands, of course, such as water pumping or transportation,280 but as 
outdoor techniques improve and become more sustainable, the allure of 
natural sunlight may become increasingly attractive for regulators and the 
marijuana industry. 
D.  Certified Organic 
There is a robust market for organic agricultural products. In 2014, 
organic sales reached an estimated $39 billion, with more and more 
Americans buying organic food.281 The rationale is straightforward: As 
public awareness of negative environmental and human health impacts 
associated with synthetic or non-organic foods or food inputs grows, so 
too will the demand for alternative organic agricultural products. One 
early form of this public awareness was conservationist Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring, published in 1962, which identified pesticides such as DDT 
as the cause of a variety of observed ecological problems.282 The book, 
along with growing public awareness and media coverage of 
environmental degradation nationwide, prompted a broad response that 
included the passage of major state and federal environmental laws.283  
  
                                                                                                                     
 278. Chelsea Harvey, The Surprisingly Huge Energy Footprint of the Booming Marijuana 
Industry, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2016/02/18/this-could-be-a-big-problem-for-the-booming-marijuana-industry/ 
?utm_term=.8fbb0ad99ca5. 
 279. Mills, supra note 260, at 59. 
 280. Id. at 62. 
 281. According to one survey, 84% of Americans purchase organic food. ORGANIC TRADE 
ASS’N, STATE OF THE INDUSTRY (2015), http://ota.com/sites/default/files/indexed_files/State 
OfOrganicIndustry_0.pdf; see also Rebecca Rivkin, Forty-Five Percent of Americans Seek Out 
Organic Foods, GALLUP (AUG. 7, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/174524/forty-five-percent-
americans-seek-organic-foods.aspx. 
 282. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 22 (1962). 
 283. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)); National 
Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012)); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7515 (2012)).  
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This recognition that human activities and natural systems were 
interconnected also prompted a return to organic farming,284 and 
eventually, development of a federal organic certification system.285 The 
1990 Organic Foods Production Act286 vested authority in the USDA to 
develop organic certification regulations.287 The National Organic 
Program is now the regulatory framework for organic agriculture and 
organic certification.288 
Unsurprisingly, there is also a market for organic marijuana.289 As 
public awareness of the environmental impact of marijuana agriculture 
grows, so too does the pressure on marijuana farmers to adopt sustainable 
farming practices. The demand for organic marijuana has prompted a 
market response that parallels the market’s response to organic foods in 
the 1970s.  
Then, in the absence of a federal regulatory framework, third-party 
organizations were created to provide independent certifications of 
organic agriculture. The Rodale Press established voluntary standards 
and a certification program, and helped organize the California Certified 
Organic Farmers and Oregon-Washington Tilth Organic Producers 
Association.290 States passed their own organic agriculture laws.291 
Oregon created the first state organic certification program, and by 1990, 
twenty-two states had developed some form of organic regulation.292 As 
the demand for organic products increased, however, these piecemeal 
approaches became problematic. Fraudulently labelled products flooded 
                                                                                                                     
 284. Farming practices prior to the twentieth century are typically considered organic 
because synthetic pesticides, fertilizers, or genetically modified products had not yet been 
developed. See KEITH S. DELAPLANE, PESTICIDE USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, 
BENEFITS, RISKS, AND TRENDS (1996) (noting that pesticide usage did not become popular until 
after World War II). 
 285. See Sara N. Pasquinelli, One False Move: The History of Organic Agriculture and 
Consequences of Non-Compliance with the Governing Laws and Regulations, 3 GOLDEN GATE 
U. ENVTL. L.J., 365, 370 (2010); Valerie J. Watnick, The Organic Foods Production Act, the 
Process/Product Distinction, and a Case for More End Product Regulation in the Organic Foods 
Market, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 40, 46 (2014). 
 286. Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 (1990) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
23 (2012)).  
 287. 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (1990); see Kyle W. Lathrop, Note, Pre-empting Apples with Oranges: 
Federal Regulation of Organic Food Labeling, 16 J. CORP. L. 885, 895 (1991).  
 288. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501?22 (2012). 
 289. Alice Truong, The Bay Area’s Latest Movement: Organic Marijuana, QUARTZ (Jan. 29, 
2015), http://qz.com/334826/the-bay-areas-latest-movement-organic-marijuana/. 
 290. See BRIAN BAKER, ORGANIC FARMING COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK: A RESOURCE GUIDE 
FOR WESTERN REGION AGRICULTURAL PROFESSIONALS 1 (2005); Student Article, Aubrey Parlet, 
Organic Foods Production: What Consumers Might Not Know About the Use of Synthetic 
Substances, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 392, 395 (2009).  
 291. Lathrop, supra note 287, at 891–92. 
 292. Id. 
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the market, state laws were inconsistent, and enforcement was 
unreliable.293 
The federal government substantially occupies the field of organic 
agriculture. The term “organic” itself has been federalized, as agricultural 
products can only be labelled organic if they were grown in accordance 
with federal standards.294 The federal government occupies the 
certification process as well, as the need for uniform federal certification 
standards and processes was a primary justification for federal organic 
legislation in the first place.295 In practice, enforcement of federal organic 
legislation often takes place at the state level by state officials 
promulgating organic certification programs, but these programs must be 
approved by the USDA and in accordance with federal standards.296 
Thus, there is room for state involvement in the form of cooperative 
federalism,297 but organic agriculture remains a federal field of 
regulation.  
Because marijuana remains a controlled substance prohibited under 
federal law, and organic certification remains a federal field of regulation, 
marijuana products cannot be labelled organic regardless of the method 
of cultivation.298 Thus far states have not developed their own 
certification programs for sustainable marijuana agriculture either. As a 
consequence, the marijuana industry has established third-party 
certification programs that attempt to recognize organic marijuana 
agriculture in indirect ways. Certification programs mirror the USDA’s 
organic agriculture requirements, but instead of using the “organic” label, 
programs use terms such as “naturally grown,” “Clean Green certified,” 
or “Certified Kind.”299  
                                                                                                                     
 293. Id. 
 294. 7 U.S.C. § 6505(a)(1) (2012); see also Quesada v. Herb Thymes Farm Inc., 361 P.3d 
868, 880 (Cal. 2015) (explaining that uniform federal standards for organic certification were 
designed to supplement and enhance state law on the matter). 
 295. 7 U.S.C. § 6503. 
 296. Id. § 6507. 
 297. But see Laura Fisher, Note, Administrative Law—All (Food) Politics Is Local: 
Cooperative Federalism, New England Small Farms, and the Food Safety Modernization Act, 37 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 337, 357 (2015) (calling for more state and local involvement in agricultural 
policy).  
 298. David Migoya & Ricardo Baca, Colorado AG’s Office Investigates Marijuana 
Companies Using “Organic,” DENV. POST (Sept. 16, 2015, 12:12 PM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2015/09/16/colorado-ags-office-investigates-marijuana-companies-
using-organic/ (“‘Marijuana may not be certified organic under the USDA organic regulations,’ 
said a USDA spokesman who could not be named because it’s the agency’s policy when 
discussing marijuana. ‘Marijuana is considered a controlled substance at the federal level, and 
organic certification is reserved for agricultural products.’”). 
 299. See, e.g., About Us, Clean Green [in small caps] (last visited Mar. 29, 
2017), https://www.cleangreencert.org/about-us/ (“Clean Green Certified was created in 2004 as 
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These marijuana certification programs compete with each other to 
represent the gold standard for organic agriculture. But as private third-
party certifiers, their impact on the industry remains limited without a 
broader regulatory framework capable of evenly applying and enforcing 
labelling standards. Already there is evidence that marijuana being 
labelled and sold as “naturally grown” has not undergone certification of 
any kind.300 In Colorado, the Colorado Department of Agriculture 
provides organic certification and enforcement on behalf of the USDA.301 
Those obligations notwithstanding, the term “organic” has been used by 
many marijuana businesses in their advertising, product labelling, and 
branding, with little to no state enforcement.302 
Because the federal government occupies the field of organic 
certification, it will be difficult for states to develop their own organic 
marijuana programs. The USDA is unlikely to approve amendments to 
state organic certification programs that incorporate marijuana 
agriculture. Absent robust certification frameworks, farmers will have 
few incentives to cultivate marijuana without synthetic pesticides or other 
substances that have adverse consequences for the environment and 
human health. At the same time, there will continue to be a market benefit 
conferred on businesses claiming to grow marijuana organically or 
naturally, regardless of the veracity of those claims. Without an 
enforcement mechanism of some kind, consumers are likely to be misled 
or the terms will begin to lose meaning. States and local jurisdictions may 
indirectly encourage organic marijuana cultivation by incorporating 
organic standards into their state or local cultivation licensing schemes, 
and if these standards are enforced and well-communicated, farmers in 
                                                                                                                     
a way to regulate legal cannabis-products that called themselves ‘organic.’ Consumers can rest 
assured when they buy a Clean Green Certified cannabis product that it has met all of the 
requirements of the rigorous program. Modeled on national and international sustainability, 
organic and biodynamic program standards, the Clean Green program requires on-site inspections 
and third-party lab testing. Much like third party certifications for traditional agricultural products, 
the whole life cycle of the plant is considered, from seed selection to harvesting and processing. 
In addition, soil, nutrients, pesticide use, mold treatment and dust control are analyzed. Clean 
Green Certified also goes further than the USDA organic in some areas, requiring every operator 
to undergo pesticide testing every year, rather than only a small percentage of farms.”); About, 
Certified Kind [in small caps] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.certified-kind.com/about/ 
(“Certified Kind offers certification, education, and consultation for cannabis growers and edibles 
processors that are committed earth friendly practices. The Certified Kind rules are similar to 
USDA Organic but Certified Kind has additional requirements to ensure fair treatment of labor 
plus rules that address environmental issues specific to cannabis production. Certified Kind is 
guided by leading experts in organic certification compliance.”). 
 300. Truong, supra note 289. 
 301. Organic, COLO. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/agplants/organic (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2017). 
 302. See Migoya & Baca, supra note 298. 
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that jurisdiction may reap a market benefit.303 More than likely, however, 
the organic marijuana industry will struggle to recognize and incentivize 
organic farming as long as the federal marijuana prohibition continues. 
E.  Replacing Federal Agricultural Resilience Programs: Crop 
Insurance and Disaster Relief 
One of the most important influences on crop production is one that 
cannot be controlled: weather. Farmers can control or influence many 
aspects of cultivation, including soil conditions, crop type, and the timing 
of key activities like seed planting and crop harvesting, but the weather 
can be difficult to predict. Routine weather events that fluctuate mildly 
from expectations—more or less rain than anticipated, for example—can 
have significant consequences for crop yields.304 But extreme weather 
events like droughts, freezes, floods, or fires can devastate crops, farmers, 
and, in turn, the stability of the market for an agricultural product.305 In 
the face of climate change and an increase in weather uncertainty, 
developing resilience to environmental variability and extreme events 
will become an important goal of agricultural policy.306  
If farmers were left to shoulder the burden of climactic uncertainty 
alone, there would likely be adverse consequences on rural economies 
and the agricultural industry as a whole. Major crop failures could lead 
to farm failures, job losses, agricultural business failures, financial sector 
stress, and price increases. Farming would become riskier and less 
attractive. Recognizing this, U.S. agricultural policy has focused on two 
mechanisms to help farmers and the agricultural industry develop 
resilience to variability and crop failures.  
The first mechanism consists of disaster relief. From 1989 to 2012, 
Congress made forty-two emergency funding appropriations that 
                                                                                                                     
 303. For reasons similar to the benefits of appellations, see Goodhue et al., supra note 205, 
at 16. 
 304. Erik Chavez et al., An End-to-End Assessment of Extreme Weather Impacts on Food 
Security, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 997, 997 (2015) (“[C]hanges in the large-scale climate 
processes that drive both regional and global climate variability affect the annual onset of rainfall 
in the tropics and subtropics, as well as rainfall patterns in temperate latitudes, thus playing a 
significant role in the variability of regional rain-fed crop production.”); see Mark R. Rosenzweig 
& Hans P. Binswanger, Wealth, Weather and the Composition and Profitability of Agricultural 
Investment, 103 ECON. J. 56, 63 (1993). 
 305. Steffen N. Johnson, A Regulatory ‘Wasteland’: Defining a Justified Federal Role in 
Crop Insurance, 72 N.D. L. REV. 505, 507 (1996). 
 306. See JOHN BEDDINGTON ET AL., CGIAR RESEARCH PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY: ACHIEVING FOOD SECURITY IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
49 (2012), https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/35589/climate_food_commission-
final-mar2012.pdf.  
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provided disaster relief to farmers in the amount of $70 billion.307 Most 
of that total went directly to farmers to compensate for low commodity 
prices or crop failures.308 Disaster relief can be an effective means of 
providing resilience and helping communities bounce back from 
disasters. Providing disaster relief in the wake of natural disasters 
receives broad political support as well.309 But ad hoc disaster relief 
presents several problems. First, the knowledge that governments will 
provide disaster funding may dissuade farmers from becoming more 
resilient (by adjusting their practices or purchasing crop insurance, for 
example).310 This, in turn, makes farmers more dependent on disaster 
relief. Second, it is hard for governments to anticipate when disaster 
funding will be needed, creating a strain on budgets and financial 
planning.311 
These challenges combine to make ad hoc disaster funding 
unappealing in many contexts, including the agriculture industry, and 
have prompted Congress to pursue a second resilience mechanism: crop 
insurance. In 1938, Congress established the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program to support and regulate crop insurance.312 Subsequent legislation 
has been enacted with the goal of making crop insurance the primary risk 
management tool for the agriculture industry.313 Today, the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation (FCIC) identifies eligible crops, sets premium 
rates, subsidizes premiums, and insures insurers.314 As of 2014, 1.2 
million crop insurance policies cover 130 crops, 294 million acres, and 
$110 billion in loss coverage.315 Because the government subsidizes 
premiums (62%, on average) and covers administrative expenses,316 the 
crop insurance program is one of the most costly components of federal 
agricultural policy.317 Nonetheless, crop insurance and disaster relief 
                                                                                                                     
 307. RALPH M. CHITE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EMERGENCY FUNDING FOR AGRICULTURE: A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, FY1989-FY2012, at 12 (2012). 
 308. Id. at summary.  
 309. Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Jacquelin Volkman-Wise, The Risk of Ever-Growing 
Disaster Relief Expectations 3–4 (Risk Mgmt. & Decision Processes Ctr., Wharton Sch., Univ. of 
Pa., Working Paper No. 2011-09, 2011).   
 310. See DARRELL L. HUETH & WILLIAM F. FURTAN, ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE CROP 
INSURANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 350 (1994). 
 311. See Michel-Kerjan & Volkman-Wise, supra note 309, at 3. 
 312. Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012). 
 313. H.R. REP. NO. 103-649 (1994); Johnson, supra note 305, at 507. 
 314. See Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 315. DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE: BACKGROUND 
2–3 (2015). 
 316. Id. at 2. 
 317. Id. at 16 (showing that costs peaked in 2012 at $14.1 billion and declined in 2014 to 
$8.7 billion).  
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payments comprise a major safety net to the agricultural industry. 
Marijuana is not a crop eligible for crop insurance under the FCIC.318 
Nor have marijuana farmers ever received federal disaster relief. This is 
unsurprising, considering the federal marijuana prohibition established 
by the Controlled Substances Act.319 But the federal prohibition has 
suppressed the emergence of marijuana crop insurance in the private 
sector as well, where most insurers are hesitant to become involved in an 
industry that remains illegal on the federal level.320  
Without insurance or disaster relief, marijuana farmers are more 
vulnerable to extreme events than other farmers, such as droughts, floods, 
and, increasingly, wildfires. California’s drought history is well-
chronicled,321 and wildfires are particularly threatening to marijuana 
crops in the American West, many of which are grown in the wildland-
urban interface where fires are most prevalent.322 Floods and fires can 
wipe out crops altogether, while droughts and smoke can damage crop 
quality.323 Catastrophic crop losses can lead to the same consequences 
(farm failures, job losses, business failures, and price increases) for 
marijuana just as easily as any other crop. 
So far, states and private insurers have only tepidly explored the 
possibility of providing crop insurance to marijuana cultivators. 
Insurance for dispensaries has led the way, but crop insurance remains an 
undeveloped market tool.324 Courts have provided mixed support for 
marijuana farmers with these nascent insurance policies. In the 2012 case 
Tracy v. USAA Casualty Insurance,325 a federal court in Hawaii agreed 
with an insurer that loss of state-legal marijuana plants was not a 
                                                                                                                     
 318. See Risk Mgmt. Agency, County Crop Programs, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
http://goo.gl/2z6GIi (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (illustrating the FCIC’s omission of marijuana on 
the list of crops eligible for crop insurance). 
 319. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(vii) (2012).  
 320. See, e.g., Ed Leefeldt, For Insurers, No Rush to Offer Pot Coverage, CBS MONEY 
WATCH (Feb. 24, 2016, 5:15 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/for-insurers-no-rush-to-offer-
pot-coverage. 
 321. See, e.g., Paul Rogers, California Drought: How Will We Know When It’s Over?, 
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 9, 2016, 9:40 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/01/09/california-
drought-how-will-we-know-when-its-over. 
 322. See Madeleine Thomas, West Coast Weed Farms Are Lighting Up, PAC. 
STANDARD (Aug. 31, 2015), https://psmag.com/west-coast-weed-farms-are-lighting-up-d46a122 
fafb3#.xyzpghjpm. 
 323. Id.  
 324. See, e.g., Michael Roberts, Medical Marijuana Crop Insurance: Putting Your Weed in 
Good Hands, WESTWORD (Feb. 10, 2010, 9:10 AM), http://www.westword.com/news/medical-
marijuana-crop-insurance-putting-your-weed-in-good-hands-5864728 (noting that early crop 
insurance policies cover only indoor growing operations). 
 325. No. 11-00487 LEK-KSC, 2012 WL 928186 (D. Haw. Mar. 16, 2012).  
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compensable claim under the insurance policy.326 While the court found 
that state-legal marijuana plants are an insurable interest,327 the federal 
marijuana prohibition preempts state marijuana law and makes the 
insurance policy (which purportedly covered the marijuana plants) an 
unenforceable contract contrary to public policy.328  
In 2016, however, a federal court in Colorado pushed back on that 
view in Green Earth Wellness Center v. Atain Specialty Insurance,329 
upholding the validity of an insurance policy’s coverage of loss from 
wildfire smoke damage to marijuana plants and products.330 Living plants 
were excluded from the policy in this instance, but the court nevertheless 
rejected the idea that covered losses are not compensable because the 
federal prohibition makes insurance claims on marijuana a violation of 
federal law and public policy.331 “[I]n light of several additional years 
evidencing a continued erosion of any clear and consistent federal public 
policy in this area,” the court declined to follow Tracy, instead finding 
valid contractual claims in which both parties intended to cover marijuana 
products as insurable commodities.332  
The Tracy and Green Earth decisions conflict, and it remains to be 
seen how other courts address the validity of insurance policies covering 
marijuana, particularly marijuana crops. The Green Earth decision paves 
the way for marijuana farmers to obtain and enforce private crop 
insurance,333 though courts might be more willing to find preemption 
concerns since crop insurance is extensively regulated on the federal 
level.  
In any case, without agricultural support programs like disaster relief 
or crop insurance, marijuana farmers and marijuana farming communities 
will remain vulnerable to extreme events. This lack of support may 
dissuade existing farmers of insured crops from incorporating marijuana 
into their crop portfolios, as well, suppressing the normalization of 
marijuana cultivation. Intrepid private insurers may be able to provide 
some relief in response to market demands, but the validity of marijuana 
insurance, and marijuana crop insurance, remains unsettled as a matter of 
law. As a consequence, the marijuana industry will not have at its disposal 
a primary tool for agricultural risk management for the foreseeable future.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 326. Id. at *13.  
 327. Id. at *10. 
 328. Id. at *13.  
 329. No. 13-cv-03452-MSK-NYW, 2016 WL 632357 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2016).  
 330. Id. at *10.  
 331. Id.  
 332. Id.  
 333. Id.  
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IV.  WHERE TO REGULATE? LOCAL ORDINANCES VS. STATE 
REGULATIONS 
This Article has explored the major legal and policy challenges that 
marijuana agriculture will impose on regulatory frameworks. The final 
question to address is: Who should have regulatory authority over 
marijuana agriculture? The question raises an issue mostly of policy 
rather than law, but there are legal components to power distribution as 
well. In short, states have a choice between regulating marijuana 
agriculture on the state level, in a centralized and top-down approach, or 
decentralizing regulatory authority to counties or municipalities, 
allowing each local government to develop its own rules and regulations 
for marijuana cultivation. If states retain power for themselves, they can 
concentrate that power in a single marijuana regulation agency, or 
coordinate responsibilities across existing agencies. If states decentralize 
and allow local governments to take a leading role, ordinances governing 
marijuana cultivation will be the primary regulatory tool. This Section 
concludes with a case study of Humboldt County, California.334 Arguably 
the county most intimately familiar with marijuana agriculture, Humboldt 
County passed the first-of-its-kind marijuana cultivation ordinance in 
January 2016.335 The ordinance provides a model for replication 
throughout California and the United States.  
A.  Marijuana Regulation and Subsidiarity 
Whether states choose to keep regulatory authority over marijuana 
agriculture at the state level, transfer those powers to local governments, 
or adopt a hybrid approach that spreads roles and responsibilities around 
government units, there will inevitably be trade-offs. Several states have 
embraced a decentralized approach, which certainly has benefits. 
Distributing power between local agencies engages those agencies in the 
regulatory process. In doing so, the regulatory framework capitalizes on 
the localized expertise, heightened awareness of changing conditions 
(ecological or economic, for example), and existing relationships 
between local stakeholders that collectively form a promising recipe for 
good governance.336 Simply put, local actors are knowledgeable about 
their community and provide legitimacy to local regulations. Conversely, 
top-down policies that do not reflect local realities often meet with 
resistance that can manifest itself in noncompliance with regulatory 
                                                                                                                     
 334. See infra Section IV.C.  
 335. See Humboldt, Cal., Ordinance 2544, § 55.4.11(a) (Jan. 16, 2016).  
 336. See Ryan Stoa, Subsidiarity in Principle: Decentralization of Water Resources 
Management, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 31, 34 (2014). 
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requirements.337 Finally, by allowing local agencies to create their own 
policies or manage their own natural resources, the collective whole 
develops resilience by experimenting with different approaches, some of 
which might fail while others foster successful innovations that other 
jurisdictions can replicate.338 
These general benefits of decentralization are particularly applicable 
to regulating marijuana agriculture. Marijuana remains a controversial 
political issue, the liberalization of which benefits from allowing 
legalization opponents to enact policies they are more comfortable 
with.339 In regions like northern California, where a large cultivation 
community exists in a remote and unique social setting, local officials are 
better suited to engage an introverted industry than are state or federal 
officials. They are also more likely to develop regulations that reflect the 
realities of marijuana cultivation, on the one hand, and the ecological or 
economic conditions of the region, on the other hand. The North Coast 
Water Quality Control Board, for example, has put forth a water quality 
regulation program for marijuana cultivation that was modified based on 
feedback from marijuana farmers in the north coast region.340 The Central 
Valley Water Quality Control Board did the same in the Central 
Valley.341 Both programs are integrated into an inter-agency, statewide 
                                                                                                                     
 337. In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville remarked, in his comparison of early 
America with France under Louis XIV, that  
administrative centralization is suitable only to enervate the peoples who submit 
to it, because it constantly tends to diminish the spirit of citizenship in them. 
Administrative centralization, it is true, succeeds in gathering at a given time and 
in a certain place all the available forces of a nation, but it is harmful to the 
multiplication of those forces. It brings the nation victory on the day of battle and 
over time reduces its power. So it can work admirably toward the passing 
greatness of a man, not toward the lasting prosperity of a people. 
1 ALEX DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL-CRITICAL EDITION 147 (Eduardo 
Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer trans., 2010) (1835) (ebook), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2285. 
 338. Stoa, supra note 336, at 34; see Graham R. Marshall, Nesting, Subsidiarity, and 
Community-Based Environmental Governance Beyond the Local Level, 2 INT’L J. COMMONS 75, 
77 (2008); Elinor Ostrom, Coping with Tragedies of the Commons, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 493, 
526 (1999). 
 339. For an example of a city ordinance that prohibits the indoor or outdoor cultivation of 
marijuana in Galt, California, see Jennifer Bonnett, Galt’s Medical Marijuana Rule Takes Effect, 
LODI NEWS-SENTINEL (Mar. 5, 2015, 6:10 AM), http://www.lodinews.com/news/article_ 
7173905e-c341-11e4-be9a-23987e765448.html. 
 340. REG’L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., EXECUTIVE OFFICER’S SUMMARY REPORT 1 
(2015), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/northcoast/board_info/board_meetings/08_2015/items/ 
07/150728_Cannabis_WDR_EOSR.pdf (documenting that forty-seven comments were received 
from the public regarding feedback on the program). 
 341. General Order for Discharge of Waste Associated with Medical Cannabis Cultivation 
Activities, No. R5-2015-0113 (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/centralvalley/ 
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strategy for marijuana irrigation regulation that should facilitate 
coherence across regions.342 This type of regulatory structure is especially 
helpful when states are regulating an industry—like marijuana—that is 
new or unfamiliar, with few established blueprints for success. 
A decentralization strategy, however, has certain vulnerabilities. 
Local agencies and jurisdictions may be authorized to develop and 
enforce their own regulations, but they may not have the institutional 
capacity to do so. Regulating marijuana agriculture may implicate 
complex tasks, like hydrological modeling or drug trafficking 
enforcement, that local agencies may be ill-equipped to handle.343 Even 
when they are, significant reforms may constitute a government taking 
requiring compensation, which local agencies may not be able to 
afford.344 Regulation requires investments in human, infrastructural, and 
technological resources that states may not be able to provide to local 
agencies, resulting in some jurisdictions with well-funded agency 
operations, and others with little to no regulatory capacities. 
A corollary of the institutional capacity challenge is that local 
agencies may not be equipped to regulate on two dimensions 
simultaneously, as the marijuana-agriculture nexus requires. Colorado’s 
Marijuana Enforcement Division, for example, is defined by its 
regulatory identification with marijuana, but not agriculture.345 The 
state’s Department of Agriculture, conversely, is equipped to regulate 
traditional crops but has received little guidance on how to address 
marijuana cultivation.346 When the Department reached out to the federal 
EPA for guidance on which general crop group (e.g., herbs, spices, 
                                                                                                                     
water_issues/cannabis/general_order/r5-2015-0113.pdf (issuing a general order to reduce water 
quality impacts associated with cultivation of cannabis).  
 342. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD. ET AL., STRATEGY FOR REGULATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF UNAUTHORIZED DIVERSIONS; DISCHARGES OF WASTE TO SURFACE AND 
GROUNDWATER CAUSED BY MARIJUANA CULTIVATION (2014), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/ 
water_issues/programs/enforcement/docs/2014strategicplan_wbcdfw.PDF. 
 343. Emily Brady’s chronicles of a Humboldt County Deputy Sheriff underline the solitary 
and seemingly futile efforts to enforce ambiguous marijuana laws in the region. EMILY BRADY, 
HUMBOLDT: LIFE ON AMERICA’S MARIJUANA FRONTIER 48 (2013).   
 344. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 568 U.S. 936 (2012). 
 345. See ENF’T DIV.—MARIJUANA, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, ANNUAL UPDATE (2015), 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/2014%20MED%20Annual%20Report_1.pdf. 
 346. See, e.g., COLO. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., FACTUAL AND POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE 
OF PESTICIDES ON CANNABIS (2016), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/atoms/ 
files/2-2016%20Factual%20and%20Policy%20Issues%20Related%20to%20the%20Use%20of 
%20Pesticides%20on%20Cannabis.pdf (receiving little guidance from the federal EPA regarding 
pesticide regulations); Letter from John W. Hickenlooper, Governor, Colo., to Tom Vilsack, 
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/ 
files/atoms/files/Letter%20to%20Secretary%20Vilsack.pdf (requesting assistance from the FDA 
regarding industrial hemp cultivation). 
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vegetables) marijuana fits into for purposes of pesticide regulation, the 
EPA could only state that marijuana fits into none of these groups.347 
Colorado’s Marijuana Enforcement Division and Department of 
Agriculture are both state-level agencies that do not have sufficient 
interdisciplinary expertise at present. The challenge can be more 
pronounced at local levels where it can be difficult to establish regulatory 
capacity on one dimension, much less two.  
Efforts to decentralize power away from a central government and 
toward local governments can also, if hastily or sloppily designed, look 
more like power abdication (in which governments shift an unwanted 
burden of regulation onto another jurisdiction) or power fragmentation 
(in which regulatory authorities are ambiguously spread between many 
different agencies). The former is a problem because while transferring 
power from state to local agencies has its benefits, the state retains an 
important role to play by supporting and coordinating local initiatives.348 
Fragmentation can also be a problem when it leads to overlapping 
mandates, uncoordinated regulation, or counter-productive policies.349 If 
local agencies are authorized to develop regulations concerning 
marijuana cultivation, the authorizations should clearly articulate which 
agency has that responsibility, and what the relationship is between that 
agency, other agencies, and the state’s broader regulatory framework. 
B.  State Agency Authority: Consolidation or Cooperation? 
If states retain regulatory authority over marijuana agriculture at the 
state level, there is a second choice to make regarding power distribution. 
Authority can be placed in a single administrative agency responsible for 
regulating all aspects of the marijuana industry, or, alternatively, states 
can assign different roles and responsibilities to multiple agencies 
according to their institutional strengths, and hope the agencies 
coordinate well enough to make the overall regulatory framework 
coherent.  
Colorado, Washington, and Oregon concentrate primary authority for 
marijuana regulation in a single state agency: the Colorado Marijuana 
                                                                                                                     
 347. COLO. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., supra note 346, para. 4. 
 348. To take a broader view of this point, cooperative federalism frameworks between the 
federal and state governments (such as the regulatory structures for the Clean Water Act or Clean 
Air Act) have been effective at utilizing the federal government’s funding streams and 
establishment of minimum standards to support state-level programs that remain relatively 
coherent from a national perspective. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and 
Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 230–31 (2005); Ryan B. Stoa, Cooperative 
Federalism in Biscayne National Park, 56 NAT. RES. J. 81, 115 (2016); Douglas Williams, Toward 
Regional Governance in Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1047, 1086–90 (2013). 
 349. See Ryan B. Stoa, Water Governance in Haiti: An Assessment of Laws and Institutional 
Capacities, 29 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 243 (2017). 
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Enforcement Division,350 the Washington Liquor and Cannabis Board,351 
and the Oregon Liquor Control Commission,352 respectively. In all three 
cases, the agency has primary authority to develop rules and regulations 
for marijuana, including aspects of marijuana agriculture. In Colorado, 
the Marijuana Enforcement Division is responsible for licensing 
cultivators and promulgating “rules for the proper regulation and control 
of the cultivation” of marijuana.353 In Washington, legislation authorizes 
the “state liquor control board to regulate” marijuana.354 And in Oregon, 
the Liquor Control Commission’s functions include the power “to 
regulate the purchase, sale, production, processing, transportation, and 
delivery of marijuana items.”355 
One of the benefits of centralized marijuana regulation is that it may 
provide clarity. The administrative agency assigned to (or created for the 
purposes of) marijuana regulation is aware of its broad mandate, other 
agencies are not confused by their rights and duties, and the private sector 
and other stakeholders can direct their attention to a single agency instead 
of navigating a complex web of agencies and rules.356 A second benefit 
is that states can more clearly invest human and financial resources in a 
single agency, whereas distributing those resources across a network of 
agencies requires a more nuanced understanding of existing agency 
capacities and needs, and investments can more easily become politically 
influenced.357 Third, because marijuana implicates a diversity of 
processes, including the regulation of cultivation, processing, 
distribution, retail sale, and consumption, as well as the agricultural, 
economic, and public health components of the marijuana industry, a 
single agency with authority over the industry as a whole is well-suited 
                                                                                                                     
 350. Marijuana Enforcement, COLO. DEP’T REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/ 
enforcement/marijuanaenforcement (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
 351. WASH. ST. LIQUOR & CANNABIS BOARD, http://www.liq.wa.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 
2017). 
 352. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, ST. OR., http://www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/ 
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
 353. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-43.4-202(2)(a)(b) (West 2016). 
 354. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.101 note (2015) (Initiative Measure No. 502, approved Nov. 
6, 2012). 
 355. H.R. 3400, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2016) (alteration in original). 
 356. See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory 
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 286–89 (2011) (discussing the problems with regulatory 
overlap, and the resultant duplicative regulation). But see Mark Holden, FDA-EPA Public Health 
Guidance on Fish Consumption: A Case Study on Informal Interagency Cooperation in “Shared 
Regulatory Space,” 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 101, 142 (2015) (concluding that joint guidance in 
certain public health realms can yield benefits contrary to current literature on agency overlap).  
 357. Dan Walters, California’s Multiple Agencies Confusing, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 5, 
2016, 7:15 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/dan-
walters/article64266927.html. 
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to coordinate regulatory activities and create a coherent legal framework 
as a whole. 
Unfortunately, regulating marijuana agriculture has not been as neat 
as states like Colorado, Washington, and Oregon may have initially 
expected. Inevitably, perhaps, the expertise and traditional functions of 
other agencies have created exceptions to the centralized agency 
paradigm. In Colorado, the Department of Agriculture, pursuant to its 
duties under the Colorado Pesticide Applicator Act,358 has established 
rules for the use of pesticides in marijuana cultivation.359 Recognizing 
that pesticide regulations implicate public health, the state assigned an 
appropriate regulatory role for the Department of Health and 
Environment, as well.360 With this expansion of agency responsibilities, 
the Governor established the Office of Marijuana Coordination to foster 
collaboration and oversight, despite the relatively central role of the 
Marijuana Enforcement Division.361 Washington’s Department of 
Agriculture has also taken an increased role in marijuana cultivation, 
establishing rules for pesticide and fertilizer use, agricultural worker 
safety, and waste disposal.362 The Washington Department of Ecology 
has also suggested that marijuana farmers will be subject to the usual 
environmental regulations the department oversees.363 Finally, the 
Oregon Department of Agriculture, while acknowledging that it is not the 
lead agency for marijuana, nonetheless has extensive rules and programs 
for marijuana cultivation.364  
It would be misleading to suggest that these states intended to 
consolidate all marijuana regulatory authority into a single agency, but it 
is clear that despite a broad mandate for lead agencies to “regulate 
marijuana,” the diverse and interdisciplinary components of the 
marijuana industry have forcibly fragmented regulatory authority to some 
extent. If an interagency approach is likely, then states may seek to 
                                                                                                                     
 358. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-10-101 to -128 (West 2016).  
 359. COLO. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PESTICIDE APPLICATORS’ ACT RULES AND REGULATIONS 
§ 17.02 (2016), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-30-2016%20 
PAA%20Cannabis%20Rule%20WEB.pdf. 
 360. Directing State Agencies to Address Threats to Public Safety Posed by Marijuana 
Contaminated by Pesticide, Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2015-015 (Nov. 12, 2015). 
 361. The Colorado Governor’s Office of Marijuana Coordination did not have a website at 
the time of writing. But see Marijuana, COLORADO, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/ 
marijuana/about-site (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (identifying the office and its role).  
 362. Pesticide and Fertilizer Use on Marijuana in Washington, WASH. ST. DEP’T. AGRIC., 
http://agr.wa.gov/pestfert/pesticides/pesticideuseonmarijuana.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
 363. Marijuana Licensing and the Environment, WASH. ST. DEP’T ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/topics/marijuana.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
 364. Cannabis (Marijuana), OR. DEP’T. AGRIC., https://www.oregon.gov/ODA/agriculture/ 
Pages/Cannabis.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
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embrace fragmentation and focus on coordinating the various regulatory 
activities of different agencies. California has largely adopted this 
approach. In January 2016, twenty years after the Compassionate Use Act 
of 1996 legalized medical marijuana in the state, the Medical Marijuana 
Regulation and Safety Act (MMRSA) came into effect.365 One of the 
MMRSA’s bills, AB 243, “would require the Department of Food and 
Agriculture, the Department of Pesticide Regulation, the State 
Department of Public Health, the Department of Fish and Wildlife, and 
the State Water Resources Control Board to promulgate regulations or 
standards relating to medical marijuana and its cultivation.”366 In 
addition, AB 243 requires that cities, counties, and their enforcement 
agencies coordinate with state agencies to implement the law, creating a 
self-described “state-mandated local program.”367 A companion bill, AB 
266, creates the Bureau of Medical Marijuana Regulation,368 but its 
regulatory functions are narrowly tailored and do not consist of broad 
authority to “regulate marijuana.” 
The advantages of a regulatory framework that distributes roles for 
marijuana regulation to a variety of administrative agencies are 
numerous. By leaving intact the existing functions and dynamics of state 
agencies, a framework of this nature is less disruptive than one that 
consolidates broad responsibilities in a single agency. Agencies have 
developed subject matter expertise, and this approach takes advantage of 
that existing knowledge and may not require as many financial or human 
investments to build up institutional capacities. In addition, by embracing 
the status quo regulatory structure, states may take advantage of existing 
partnerships, stakeholder relationships, and interagency programs that 
enhance interdisciplinary regulation. It is more likely that this approach 
will normalize marijuana cultivation because a broad spectrum of 
agencies is responsible for incorporating the marijuana industry into their 
regulatory frameworks, increasing engagement with the industry and the 
likelihood that emerging issues will be addressed by appropriate officials. 
There are, inevitably, drawbacks to this approach. The primary 
challenge is that interagency coordination is notoriously difficult.369 It is 
easy for the California legislature to ask a multitude of state agencies to 
create appropriate rules and regulations; it is not easy for those agencies 
to create them in an integrated, coordinated, and coherent way. It remains 
to be seen if these agencies will succeed in their mission. Compounding 
this coordination challenge is California’s “state-mandated local 
                                                                                                                     
 365. A.B. 243, 2015–16 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); A.B. 266, 2015–16 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); S. 643, 2015–16 Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
 366. A.B. 243. 
 367. Id.  
 368. A.B. 266. 
 369. Aagaard, supra note 356, at 288; see Stoa, supra note 349, at 115. 
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program,” requiring agencies to not only coordinate with each other on 
the horizontal governance axis, but to coordinate with local governments 
on the vertical governance axis as well. Prior to enactment of the 
MMRSA, the state’s water quality regulators were trying to convince 
marijuana farmers in northern California to buy into their water quality 
monitoring program at the same time that sheriff’s departments were 
conducting raids and making arrests.370  
Aside from the coordination challenge, fragmentation of authority 
may create compliance problems for the marijuana industry. It will be 
more difficult for marijuana farmers to comply with state and local laws 
if each agency has extensive permitting or licensing procedures. 
Considering the marijuana industry’s black market history, if these 
procedures are too onerous, many farmers may be tempted to remain in 
the shadows. And while agencies have specialized expertise in their fields 
of practice, it is not clear that existing capacities will be sufficient to 
address the novel and burgeoning marijuana industry. It may be, instead, 
that investments will need to be made to understand the nuances of 
marijuana cultivation, and to make those investments for each agency 
may not be an efficient allocation of resources. 
Regardless of approach, states will need to address the challenges of 
consolidation or cooperation. In making these distinctions, this Article 
does not suggest that the choice is black and white. Inevitably, states that 
prefer a consolidated approach will need to involve other state agencies 
to some extent, while states that prefer a coordinated approach will need 
to integrate efforts to create an efficient and coherent regulatory 
framework. States should not assume that a single agency can regulate all 
aspects of marijuana agriculture, nor should they assume that existing 
agencies can address regulatory challenges by applying traditional 
methods. An important factor for power distribution may be the 
characteristics and track record of a state’s administrative landscape: If a 
state has a strong track record of agency coordination, the coordinated 
approach makes sense. If it does not, consolidating authority into a single 
agency may be the best way to develop a regulatory framework in a 
timely and responsive manner. 
C.  The Future of Marijuana Ordinances: Humboldt County, California, 
Leads the Way 
As the California MMRSA demonstrates, local governments may play 
a strong role in regulating marijuana agriculture, regardless of whether 
states retain substantial regulatory powers. Granting counties and cities 
the power to adopt their own rules and regulations appears to be a 
common feature in the early legalization states, such as California and 
                                                                                                                     
 370. Baumann, supra note 16; Media Release, Cal. Water Bds., supra note 254.   
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Colorado. The cause is likely multi-faceted. States may want to foster a 
multitude of regulatory approaches to experiment with and identify those 
rules and regulations that might work best on the state level. In addition, 
because legalization has thus far taken place primarily by ballot initiative, 
legislatures may be politically hesitant to embrace the marijuana industry, 
and providing a strong role for local governments may be an effective 
means of reducing political conflicts. 
In any case, local governments are likely to use their power to make 
ordinances the primary legal mechanism to regulate marijuana 
agriculture. Ordinances have the force of law, and can regulate a variety 
of local issues, such as public health and safety, land use, and use of 
public spaces. State constitutions or state statutes grant counties or 
municipalities the power to enact ordinances. The California MMRSA, 
for example, authorizes local governments to enact local laws in 
accordance with the state statute.371 Colorado grants extensive powers to 
city and county governments, allowing them to increase taxes or prohibit 
marijuana cultivation altogether.372 Washington did not initially grant 
cities and counties the power to enact marijuana regulations, but many 
municipalities took it upon themselves to enact their own regulations 
anyway, a practice that was subsequently upheld in Green Collar LLC v. 
Pierce County.373 
In many of these cases, local governments are using ordinances to 
prohibit marijuana cultivation, sale, or consumption.374 In other cases, 
ordinances have made relatively minor adjustments to state 
regulations.375 Thus far, local ordinances have not been a major tool for 
the regulation of marijuana agriculture. In that respect, Humboldt County, 
California, may be the first county in the United States to enact a 
comprehensive marijuana agriculture ordinance. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 371. A.B. 266 (Section 19316(a) reads: “Pursuant to Section 7 of Article XI of the California 
Constitution, a . . . county may adopt ordinances that establish additional standards, requirements, 
and regulations for local licenses and permits for commercial cannabis activity.”). 
 372. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(5)(b)(II)(f). 
 373. Green Collar, LLC v. Pierce County, No. 14-2-11323-0, 2014 WL 8187081 (Wash. 
Super. Ct. 2014); see 2014 Op. Att’y Gen. 2 (Wash.), 2014 WL 201832. 
 374. Seventy-five cities or counties in Washington have banned marijuana. See Map of 
Zoning Ordinances, Marijuana Regulation in Washington State, MRSC, http://mrsc.org/ 
Home/Explore-Topics/Legal/Regulation/Marijuana-Regulation-in-Washington-State.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2017). As of December 2014, 165 municipalities had banned marijuana in 
Colorado. See John Aguilar & Jon Murray, Colorado Cities and Towns Take Diverging Paths on 
Recreational Pot, DENV. POST (Dec. 19, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ 
2014/12/19/colorado-cities-and-towns-take-diverging-paths-on-recreational-pot-2/. 
 375. Richland, Wash., Ordinance 01-13 (Jan. 15, 2013).   
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When the MMRSA was signed into law in October 2015, an 
“inadvertent drafting error” in AB 243 appeared to require that local 
jurisdictions implement marijuana cultivation regulations by March 1, 
2016; otherwise that power would return to the state Department of Food 
and Agriculture.376 The inadvertently narrow timeframe made it 
unrealistic for most cities and counties to develop a comprehensive 
marijuana agriculture regulation framework. An urgency statute was 
signed into law in February 2016,377 eliminating the March 1 deadline, 
but by that time many local governments had retained their authority by 
simply banning marijuana cultivation,378 an outcome that was not the 
intent of the statute.  
Humboldt County, however, had been working diligently to create the 
most robust marijuana agriculture framework by the March 1 deadline, 
and the Commercial Medical Marijuana Land Use Ordinance (Marijuana 
Ordinance) was enacted in late January 2016.379 In part, Humboldt 
County was able to meet the deadline because it had been working on the 
Marijuana Ordinance for several years, in collaboration with marijuana 
industry groups and farming representatives.380 The close collaboration 
between local officials and industry representatives enabled the 
ordinance drafting process to move forward quickly and with political 
support, a dynamic that may prove equally helpful in other jurisdictions. 
The Marijuana Ordinance itself is relatively comprehensive in scope, 
addressing farming styles (indoor, outdoor, and mixed), historical use 
protections and benefits for existing farms, tiered permitting 
requirements based on zoning classifications, total farm acreage and 
marijuana cultivation area, water quantity and quality protections, energy 
use, and farm labor standards. The ordinance addresses many of the 
issues explored in this Article, and the choices those issues present to 
local governments. The ordinance represents a clear attempt to regulate 
                                                                                                                     
 376. See Letter from Jim Wood, Assemb. Member, 2d Dist., to Cty. & City Gov’t Officials 
(2016). 
 377. A.B. 21, 2015–16 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).   
 378. For a list of ordinances banning marijuana, see Bans by County, CAL. NORML, 
www.canorml.org/bansbycounty.xlsx (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
 379. Humboldt, Cal., Ordinance 2544, § 55.4.9 (Jan. 16, 2016).  
 380. The final ordinance was substantially based on a model marijuana agriculture ordinance 
developed by the California Cannabis Voice Humboldt, and transferred to the Humboldt County 
Board of Supervisors. See Interview with Anonymous Member of California Cannabis Voice 
Humboldt, supra note 177; Ryan Burns, County Takes the Reins on Marijuana Regs as CCVH 
Steps Back, LOCAL COAST OUTPOST (Sept. 15, 2015, 3:14 PM), https://lostcoastoutpost.com/ 
2015/sep/15/county-takes-reins-marijuana-regs/; Humboldt Supervisors to Use CCVH as 
Framework for Local Marijuana Regulations, NEWS CHANNEL 3, http://kiem-tv.com/video/ 
humboldt-supervisors-use-ccvh-ordinance-framework-local-marijuana-regulations (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2017).  
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marijuana agriculture in a tailored fashion; marijuana cultivation limits 
(no more than one acre) indicate a preference for small-scale farming and 
a rejection of large-scale consolidation models,381 demonstration of 
sufficient water rights and water quality compliance permits are 
required,382 and energy used in indoor farms must come from renewable 
sources or be offset with carbon credits.383 The ordinance even attempts 
to create a “Humboldt Artisanal Branding” certification program for 
small-scale, organic marijuana farms.384 The Marijuana Ordinance does 
not address crop insurance or disaster relief, but local governments are 
not well-suited to provide financial services of this nature. 
The central tension local governments face when regulating marijuana 
agriculture, particularly in jurisdictions where marijuana is already a 
primary crop, is between the need to bring farmers out of the shadows 
and into the regulatory system, on the one hand, and the need to create 
and enforce regulations that have a meaningful impact on cultivation and 
the direction and impact of the industry, on the other hand. The Marijuana 
Ordinance addresses this tension by incentivizing existing farmers to 
register and participate with the county by providing benefits to those 
farmers who step forward within 180 days following passage of the 
Ordinance.385 Those benefits include a larger maximum cultivation area 
(43,560 square feet, as opposed to a maximum 10,000 square feet for new 
farms),386 as well as a certificate of good standing for purposes of priority 
processing of state permits.387 Additionally, the ordinance incentivizes 
the retirement and relocation of existing farms located in environmentally 
sensitive areas by allowing farmers to cultivate an area four times larger 
in environmentally resilient areas.388 
It remains to be seen if the certificate of good standing will have 
meaningful value, but the cultivation area restrictions on new farms 
(which would include existing farms that chose not to register by the 
deadline) are significant, and may ultimately provide a pronounced 
advantage to existing farmers, who can cultivate an area over four times 
larger than new farmers. In my conversations with farmers in the county, 
“to legalize or not to legalize” has been a frequent topic of debate.389 
Considering the isolationist nature of the marijuana farming industry in 
                                                                                                                     
 381. Ordinance 2544, § 55.4.9. 
 382. Id. § 55.4.10(c)–(i). 
 383. Id. § 55.4.8.3. 
 384. Id. § 55.4.15. 
 385. Id. § 55.4.9.4.  
 386. Id. § 55.4.9.  
 387. Id. § 55.4.9.4. 
 388. Id. § 55.4.14. 
 389. Interview with Marijuana Farmers, in Willow Creek, Cal. (Mar. 15, 2016). 
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northern California, that debate is a promising sign for the county. 
In other aspects, the Marijuana Ordinance is less well thought-out. It 
is logical to require that marijuana farmers have water rights (either 
riparian or by appropriation) sufficient to meet their agricultural needs,390 
as well as water use plans and other documents certifying water use,391 
but the ordinance may require water rights holders to agree to forego any 
water diversions from May 15 to October 31.392 Instead, marijuana 
farmers would be required to collect and store water during the rainy 
season in quantities sufficient for the dry season. While there is some 
evidence that water used for purposes of marijuana cultivation may have 
adverse effects on water resources during periods of low flow,393 the 
ordinance’s prohibition on dry season water use as a general rule is 
unprecedented.394  
The environmental impacts of this rule are unclear, as well. While wet 
season flows are high and waterways can likely support an increase in 
diversions, ecological processes may depend on these traditionally high 
flows, and widespread wet season diversions and water storage may 
disrupt the wet season environment.395 In addition, because irrigation 
demands are substantial during the dry season, the environmental impact 
of building large storage tanks on every marijuana farm, necessitating 
building materials, construction waste, and a storage footprint, may 
outweigh the benefits intended by the rule. Moreover, if marijuana 
                                                                                                                     
 390. Ordinance 2544, §§ 55.4.10(e), 55.4.11(c). 
 391. Id. § 55.4.10(f)–(i). 
 392. Id. § 55.4.11(l).  
Where surface water diversion provides any part of the water supply for 
irrigation of cannabis cultivation, the applicant shall either: 1) consent to forebear 
from any such diversion during the period from May 15th to October 31st of each 
year and establish on-site water storage for retention of wet season flows 
sufficient to provide adequate irrigation water for the size of the area to be 
cultivated, or 2) submit a water management plan prepared by a qualified person 
such as a licensed engineer, hydrologist, or similar qualified professional, that 
establishes minimum water storage and forbearance period, if required, based 
upon local site conditions, or 3) obtain approval from the RWQCB through 
enrollment pursuant to NCRWQB Order No.2015-0023 and/or preparation of a 
Water Resources Protection Plan. 
Id. 
 393. See sources cited supra note 13. 
 394. There are, of course, instances in which water rights must be correlatively curtailed 
during unusually dry seasons, but it appears that no water regulation framework prohibits water 
rights holders growing certain crops from making use of their water resources on a seasonal basis. 
 395. See, e.g., Charles Batchelor et al., Do Water Saving Technologies Improve 
Environmental Flows, 518 J.  HYDROLOGY 140, 148 (2014) (arguing that water-saving methods 
may often have perverse results on water resources). 
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farmers find this rule unreasonable and infeasible, they may reject the 
ordinance and regulatory process as a whole. 
Cognizant of its shortcomings and the hurried nature of its drafting, 
the authors of the Marijuana Ordinance included a flexibility provision 
that may reassure skeptical farmers that compliance is attainable. If, upon 
inspection, a marijuana farm does not comply with the requirements of 
the ordinance, a farmer may nonetheless be granted a provisional license, 
as well as a two-year window within which to cure the violation.396 The 
provision is not only generous with respect to the compliance grace 
period, but also may provide enough time for county officials and 
marijuana farming representatives to address problematic aspects of the 
ordinance and make amendments prior to enforcement of violations. It 
will take time for farmers to adjust to the dry season water use ban, if they 
adjust at all, but two years may be sufficient to devise wet-season storage 
infrastructure or develop an alternative water use plan with the county 
and state officials.  
It is clear that marijuana ordinances are in their infancy. So far most 
local governments have only superficially addressed marijuana 
agriculture. Humboldt County, however, has capitalized on its economic 
and political ties with the marijuana farming community to develop a 
first-of-its-kind marijuana agriculture ordinance. It remains to be seen if 
the county’s marijuana farmers buy into the regulatory framework, but 
initial signs are promising.397 As marijuana legalization and regulation 
moves forward, the Humboldt County Marijuana Ordinance may prove 
to be a model for local governments. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Many continue to ignore the agricultural element of the marijuana 
industry, but there are signs that the regulatory blind-spot is starting to 
change. Every year California celebrates Agriculture Day outside the 
state capitol, welcoming agriculture industry representatives to display 
exhibits and meet with state lawmakers.398 Agriculture Day 2016 had a 
new flavor, however, as the marijuana industry, including farmers and 
lobbyists, came out in force.399 And Humboldt County has not been the 
only county to consider comprehensive agricultural reforms that address 
                                                                                                                     
 396. Ordinance 2544, § 55.4.11(a). 
 397. But see Will Houston, Marijuana Group Poised to Sue County, EUREKA TIMES-
STANDARD (Feb. 25, 2016, 4:13 PM), http://www.times-standard.com/article/NJ/20160225/ 
NEWS/160229929. 
 398. AG Day 2016, CAL. DEP’T FOOD & AGRIC. (Mar. 30, 2016), https://goo.gl/96k0Go. 
 399. Jeremy B. White, California Ag Day Attracts Budding Marijuana Industry, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 15, 2016, 11:00 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
government/capitol-alert/article66264227.html. 
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marijuana cultivation. Mendocino County has proposed a regulatory 
framework that would acknowledge, if not address, many of the 
marijuana agriculture issues identified in this study. Drafts for the 
proposal call for cultivation-area size limits to prevent large-scale farms 
from dominating the market, compliance with environmental regulations, 
a residency requirement to protect local farmers, and consideration of an 
organic certification program or appellation system.400 Meanwhile, the 
public has raised concerns about whether the county has the regulatory 
capacity to enforce the program, as well as whether marijuana farmers 
would actually participate.401  
These are themes and issues that local and state governments will face 
as they legalize marijuana cultivation. And while recognizing that the 
marijuana industry has an agricultural component is a step in the right 
direction, awareness is not enough. States and local governments will 
need to develop, monitor, and enforce regulatory systems that address the 
most pressing agricultural challenges the marijuana industry poses. 
Especially during times of transition, the stakes are high. States will need 
to find the Goldilocks regulation that is “just right” for the marijuana 
industry and local environments. Failing to regulate marijuana 
agriculture, or regulating too loosely, will have consequences: the 
industry may evolve into a form that does not serve the public interest or 
existing marijuana farmers; the environmental impacts of unregulated 
marijuana cultivation will likely become more pronounced; marijuana 
farmers will have few incentives to cultivate using the most responsible 
or sustainable agricultural practices. On the other hand, onerous 
regulatory approaches will not serve the public or the marijuana industry, 
either: existing marijuana farmers may be reluctant to participate in legal 
systems and may therefore perpetuate a black market for marijuana; 
existing farmers growing other crops may similarly be dissuaded from 
incorporating marijuana into their crop portfolios;402 if states or local 
governments lack the capacity to enforce rigorous regulatory programs, 
the law will be a regulation in name only.403  
For these reasons, it is appropriate that governments work with the 
marijuana industry and adopt an incremental or gradual approach that 
remains flexible enough to respond to regulatory successes and failures. 
As each state or locality presents a unique economic, environmental, and 
                                                                                                                     
 400. Jane Futcher, Ad Hoc-ing Mendo’s Pot Rules, ANDERSON VALLEY ADVERTISER (Mar. 
23, 2016), http://theava.com/archives/54206. 
 401. Id. 
 402. See, e.g., Ezra David Romero, Could Marijuana Become California’s Next Big Ag 
Crop?, KQED NEWS (Feb. 16, 2016), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2016/02/16/could-marijuana-
become-californias-next-big-ag-crop. 
 403.  See White, supra note 27 (“If they set up too rigorous of a program then they will not 
get buy-in, and if they don’t get buy-in nothing has changed . . . .”). 
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political context, no single regulatory approach to marijuana agriculture 
will suffice for adoption across the board. However, it is likely that as 
governments experiment with marijuana agriculture regulations, certain 
aspects or principles will emerge.  
It seems likely, for example, that states or local governments will 
create certification programs for organic or sustainably grown marijuana 
that encourages particular farming practices and adds value to certain 
types of marijuana products. Given widespread fears that the marijuana 
industry will turn into a commoditized, consolidated Big Ag business 
dominated by conglomerates, limits on cultivation area may become a 
common regulatory feature. It remains to be seen, however, if this will 
push the industry toward adopting the appellation model favored by the 
wine industry. 
Environmental regulations present some uncertainties. While existing 
environmental regulations that address agricultural practices could be 
applied to the marijuana industry, in some circumstances those 
regulations may be excessive for purposes of marijuana cultivation, while 
in other circumstances lawmakers may prefer to use marijuana 
legalization as an opportunity to impose more robust environmental 
regulations. Humboldt County’s dry-season water-withdrawal 
prohibition or renewable energy requirement are prime examples of 
regulations tailored to the marijuana industry that go beyond what would 
normally be expected for agricultural cultivation.  
Finally, state and local governments will need to decide where to place 
regulatory authority for marijuana agriculture. This is a particularly 
muddled issue because the federal government, traditionally heavily 
involved in agricultural policy, is not a participant in the emerging 
practice of marijuana agriculture regulation. States may consolidate 
authority into one state agency, delegate responsibilities to several 
agencies, or empower local governments to impose their own regulatory 
frameworks. Each approach has trade-offs and implications for marijuana 
agriculture. 
This diversity of regulatory options may create an element of 
confusion for states and the marijuana industry, and this Article has 
attempted to clear up that confusion by identifying the most problematic 
regulatory issues, as well as the approaches that are best suited to address 
them. And while the way forward may lack consensus, regulatory 
experimentation may eventually catalyze the adoption of legal 
frameworks that are responsive to the realities of the marijuana industry, 
institutional capacities, and the natural environment. Regulation of 
marijuana agriculture is in its infancy, and in these early days it is 
inevitable that some regulations will create more problems than they 
solve. But with infancy comes the potential for tremendous growth, and 
regulatory challenges may provide an important opportunity for states 
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and the marijuana industry to collaboratively shape the future of 
marijuana agriculture. 
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